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H I G H L I G H T S
• A multiagent framework was established to simulate P2P energy sharing.
• Indexes were proposed to evaluate P2P energy sharing mechanisms.
• Heuristic techniques were devised to facilitate convergence of simulation.
• Three existing P2P mechanisms were evaluated in Great Britain context.
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A B S T R A C T
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy sharing involves novel technologies and business models at the demand-side of power
systems, which is able to manage the increasing connection of distributed energy resources (DERs). In P2P
energy sharing, prosumers directly trade energy with each other to achieve a win-win outcome. From the
perspectives of power systems, P2P energy sharing has the potential to facilitate local energy balance and self-
suﬃciency. A systematic index system was developed to evaluate the performance of various P2P energy sharing
mechanisms based on a multiagent-based simulation framework. The simulation framework is composed of three
types of agents and three corresponding models. Two techniques, i.e. step length control and learning process
involvement, and a last-defence mechanism were proposed to facilitate the convergence of simulation and deal
with the divergence. The evaluation indexes include three economic indexes, i.e. value tapping, participation
willing and equality, and three technical indexes, i.e. energy balance, power ﬂatness and self-suﬃciency. They
are normalised and further synthesized to reﬂect the overall performance. The proposed methods were applied
to simulate and evaluate three existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms, i.e. the supply and demand ratio (SDR),
mid-market rate (MMR) and bill sharing (BS), for residential customers in current and future scenarios of Great
Britain. Simulation results showed that both of the step length control and learning process involvement tech-
niques improve the performance of P2P energy sharing mechanisms with moderate ramping/learning rates. The
results also showed that P2P energy sharing has the potential to bring both economic and technical beneﬁts for
Great Britain. In terms of the overall performance, the SDR mechanism outperforms all the other mechanisms,
and the MMR mechanism has good performance when with moderate PV penetration levels. The BS mechanism
performs at the similar level as the conventional paradigm. The conclusion on the mechanism performance is not
sensitive to season factors, day types and retail price schemes.
1. Introduction
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of distributed
energy resources (DERs) connected to the demand side of power sys-
tems. DERs include distributed generators, energy storage systems and
ﬂexible demands, and are usually connected to individual houses,
buildings, microgrids or distribution networks [1]. The proliferation of
DERs pose many challenges, such as reverse power ﬂow and over-vol-
tage issues due to distributed generation, but also bring increasing
ﬂexibility contained in energy storage systems and ﬂexible demands
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[2]. Therefore, there have been increasing interests in investigating
how to manage DERs in an optimal way, with a large number of aca-
demic literature published and industrial technologies developed.
In the management of DERs, there are mainly two types of entities,
i.e. operators and prosumers. The operators refer to either market op-
erators that organise the energy trading between DERs, as well as the
related consumers and retailers; or network operators (e.g. distribution
network operators, microgrid operators, etc.) that deal with network
planning and operation [3]. Prosumers refer to the owners of various
DERs, and they are able to generate electricity as well as consume
electricity [4]. The research on the management of DERs is categorised
into two main streams according to the relationship between operators
and prosumers.
In the ﬁrst category, the operators coordinate all the DERs in a
centralized or distributed way to maximise the overall economic ben-
eﬁts or to provide speciﬁc types of ancillary services, such as frequency
response and voltage support, for power systems [5]. For centralized
coordination, direct control is extensively studied and applied to con-
trol demand-side resources such as residential and commercial ther-
mostatically controlled loads (TCLs) [6,7], energy storage systems [8]
and electric vehicles (EVs) [9]. For distributed coordination, many
techniques, such as stochastic pricing [10], Lagrange relaxation (LR)
[11] and alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)-based
optimization [12], are used to obtain a desirable outcome by achieving
a convergence (e.g. Nash equilibrium) after an iterative procedure. The
objective functions of methods in this category, for both centralized and
distributed ones, are mostly to maximise the overall beneﬁts or to
achieve certain overall performance of the whole population of DERs,
rather than to maximise the beneﬁts of each individual prosumer.
Therefore, additional incentives are usually needed to be provided for
prosumers to make them participate and allow the intrusive control of
their DERs.
In the second category, the operators only provide a local market
platform with necessary functions, in which all the prosumers trade or
share energy with each other in order to maximise their own beneﬁts
individually. Therefore, in this framework, prosumers have full control
of their own DERs, and no additional incentives are needed to motivate
prosumers to participate. Moreover, reduced computational time and
communication infrastructure are required due to its distributed nature
[13]. This framework, which is the so-called “peer-to-peer (P2P) energy
sharing”, is considered in this paper. A number of studies have been
conducted in academia on designing proper mechanisms for P2P energy
sharing [13–17], and also a rapidly growing number of commercial or
pilot projects have been carried out in practice [18–27]. Detailed lit-
erature review will be presented in the next section.
Although there are booming research and practices in P2P energy
sharing, there is still a lack of systematic methodology to evaluate and
compare diﬀerent P2P energy sharing mechanisms. This issue is of great
signiﬁcance both in academia and industry. A good evaluation method
is able to assess the strengths and drawbacks of certain mechanisms,
which lights the way for further improvement. In practice, the eva-
luation method is capable of comparing the performance of several
candidate mechanisms, and hence implementing the best mechanism.
Although there are a few evaluation indexes scattered in existing stu-
dies to assess the performance of P2P energy sharing mechanisms, such
as total energy cost and peak-to-average ratio (PAR), there are still
signiﬁcant research gaps:
(1) The performance results derived in the existing studies are usually
based on the simulation results with diﬀerent assumptions of the
prosumers’ decision-making model. Also, some existing mechan-
isms do not specify the implementation process. Therefore, a sys-
tematic and general simulation framework is needed, which in-
cludes all fundamental elements of P2P energy sharing mechanisms
and does not rely on speciﬁc forms of decision-making or im-
plementation models. The objective of such simulation framework
is to make the simulation results (e.g. energy cost of prosumers)
under diﬀerent P2P energy sharing mechanisms comparable to each
other in a uniﬁed case (e.g. a community microgrid).
(2) More aspects of economic performance remain to be reﬂected be-
sides the total energy cost. Firstly, the cost saving potential that can
be achieved by P2P energy sharing within an area actually has a
theoretical upper limit. This upper limit can be used to measure
how much potential has been gained and how much more still re-
mains to be explored by adopting a certain P2P energy sharing
mechanism. Secondly, an index needs to be deﬁned to show whe-
ther the economic beneﬁts obtained by each prosumer are large
enough to keep the prosumer staying in the mechanism. Thirdly, it
is worth to measure the income inequality among the prosumers in
the mechanism besides evaluating the overall cost.
(3) Some existing technical performance indexes need to be extended
to assess P2P energy sharing mechanisms. For example, PAR is
widely used to reﬂect the ﬂatness of load curves. However, for a
region with many DERs, the maximum loading of the grid trans-
former may occur when the total load (net load) is negative, so the
deﬁnition of PAR needs to be extended.
To ﬁll the above research gaps, a systematic methodology was
proposed. The main contributions of the paper are presented as follows:
(1) A general multiagent-based framework was established for the ﬁrst
time to simulate the behaviours of prosumers under various P2P
energy sharing mechanisms. The framework consists of three types
of agents and three corresponding models. Two techniques, i.e. step
length control and learning process involvement, were proposed to
facilitate the convergence of the mechanism. A last-defence me-
chanism was established to deal with the divergence. The simula-
tion results are used for calculating the index values for evaluation.
(2) A novel index system was established to evaluate the performance
of P2P energy sharing mechanisms. The index system includes three
economic indexes (i.e. value tapping, participation willing and in-
come equality) and three technical indexes (i.e. energy balance,
power ﬂatness and self-suﬃciency). These indexes are normalised
and further synthesized into one systemic index to reﬂect the
overall performance.
(3) Three typical existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms were eval-
uated in current and future scenarios of the power systems in Great
Britain (GB). The results veriﬁed the eﬀectiveness of the proposed
simulation and evaluation methodology, and provided some prac-
tical implications on applying P2P energy sharing in the power
system in GB.
2. Literature review on P2P energy sharing
This section reviews and comments on existing academic studies
and practical projects on P2P energy sharing.
2.1. Academic studies
Some P2P energy sharing mechanisms have been proposed by re-
searchers in the world, although they might have diﬀerent names in
respective studies.
Cintuglu et al. [14] created a competitive market environment for
DER owners in a grid-connected microgrid by designing a reverse
auction model. In this model, the lumped load is able to be supplied
with the lowest cost due to the competitive behaviours of DER owners.
A multiagent system was designed and realised at the Florida Interna-
tional University smart grid test system to simulate and verify the
proposed model. Three aspects of work remain to be done regarding
this study: (1) the consumers were considered as an aggregated agent
(rather than individual agents); (2) the decision-making process of
energy storage owners was quite simple and heuristic; (3) no ﬂexible
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demand was considered.
Also targeting at a grid-connected community microgrid, Shamsi
et al. [15] proposed a community energy market in which each pro-
sumer is capable of trading electricity with others. Agent-based ap-
proach was used to simulate the behaviours of prosumers as well.
Compared to the work in Ref. [14], each agent makes decisions by
solving an optimization problem rather than follow heuristic rules, and
a learning mechanism based 1-D recursive least squares was assumed
for each agent to estimate and track the spot price and demand level for
decision making. However, this study did not consider ﬂexible demand
either.
In contrast, Paola et al. [13] proposed price-based schemes for
distributed coordination of ﬂexible demand within a game-theoretical
framework, but did not consider distributed generation or energy sto-
rage systems. Furthermore, some considerations were missing (e.g. the
existence of the utility grid with inﬁnite capacity at its set price) or not
applicable (e.g. the strictly increasing monotonicity of the power price
function with respect to power demand) for P2P energy sharing in
microgrids or local distribution networks.
Chao et al. proposed three diﬀerent market paradigms, i.e. bill
sharing (BS), mid-market rate (MMR) and auction-based pricing
strategy (APS), for P2P energy sharing [16]. Bill sharing is a pro rata
cost sharing mechanism based on the proportion of each prosumer’s
energy production and consumption in those of the whole community.
In the mid-market rate mechanism, the trading price among prosumers
is set at the average of the selling and buying prices set by the retailer,
with some adjustment based on the diﬀerence between the total energy
production and consumption within the community. Auction-based
pricing strategy is an auction market similar to that presented in Ref.
[15] with some minor adjustments. Simple performance evaluation was
conducted for the proposed mechanisms in a community microgrid
without the presence of any energy storage and ﬂexible demand.
Liu et al. designed an energy sharing model for P2P prosumers with
photovoltaic (PV) arrays and price-based demand response in a mi-
crogrid, in which the internal prices are decided based on the supply
and demand ratio (SDR) in the microgrid [17]. The proposed model was
supported by theoretical analysis and simulation result. One drawback
of the model is that the iterative pricing process might not converge and
is aﬀected by the demand response participation level.
In this paper, three of the above P2P energy sharing mechanisms.
i.e. the bill sharing and mid-market rate mechanisms in Ref. [16] and
the supply and demand ratio mechanism in Ref. [17], were chosen to be
evaluated using the proposed simulation and evaluation methods,
considering that they are applicable to prosumers with both local
generation and ﬂexible demand. Detailed description on the three
mechanisms refer to Appendix A.2.
Note that although this paper took two P2P energy sharing me-
chanisms from Ref. [16] to evaluate, this paper made signiﬁcant novel
contribution. Ref. [16] did not establish systematic simulation and
evaluation frameworks for P2P energy sharing, and did not consider the
ﬂexibility contained in prosumers either, which both have been ad-
dressed in this paper.
2.2. Practical projects
Electric utilities, industrial enterprises and high-tech start-ups have
shown increasing interests in P2P energy sharing and conducted a
number of relevant projects with diverse focuses and characteristics.
A number of projects focus on creating a trading platform for gen-
erators, consumers and prosumers to directly trade energy with each
other, such as Piclo in the UK [18], Vandebron in the Netherland [19],
SonnenCommunity in Germany [20] and Yeloha [21] and TransActive
Grid [22] in the US. In these projects, the trading platforms are all
realised as online websites for information acquisition and transaction
conduction, and are most targeted at renewable energy. The main
function of the platforms is to link the energy supply and demand by
providing information, metering and billing services.
In spite of the similarities, these projects diﬀer in various ways. First
of all, the projects aim at diﬀerent geographical scales. For example,
Piclo, Vandebron and SonnenCommunity aim at national scale services,
while Yeloha and TransActive Grid are for regional networks and mi-
crogrids respectively [23]. Besides that, some projects have speciﬁc
focus, such as energy storage for SonnenCommunity and solar panels
for Yeloha.
Moreover, the business models of the projects are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent in terms of business entities, customers, value propositions and
proﬁt structure, as summarized in Ref. [24]. First of all, the projects are
run by diﬀerent types of business entities including renewable energy
supplier (Good Energy in Piclo), online platform operator (Vandebron),
battery manufacturer (sonnenBatterie in sonnenCommunity), energy
sharing intermedium (Yeloha) and microgrid operator (LO3 Energy in
TransActive Grid). As for customers, although the projects all try to link
renewable energy suppliers and consumers, some of them focus on
speciﬁc types of customers. For example, Piclo mainly engages large
commercial consumers, while Yeloha pays special attention to the land
owners who can provide sites for solar panel installation. Furthermore,
the projects propose value propositions from diﬀerent perspectives.
Piclo and Vandebron are characterized by matching preferences of
energy suppliers and consumers, while Yeloha claims to reduce elec-
tricity bills both for solar energy suppliers and consumers. sonnen-
Community emphasizes the beneﬁts brought by energy storage, while
TransActive Grid highlights the increasing reliability supported by local
power supply. Last but not least, the operators of the projects make
proﬁts in diﬀerent ways. Piclo is a pilot project, thus relying on the
government investment and venture capital. Vandebron charges a
monthly subscription fee ($12 per month) from both energy suppliers
and consumers. Yeloha shares beneﬁts with solar power suppliers and
charges fees from solar power consumers. sonnenBatterie mainly makes
proﬁts through the sale of batteries. The proﬁt source of LO3 Energy in
TransActive Grid is still not clear so far.
There are also projects focusing on the supporting technologies for
P2P energy sharing. PeerEnergyCloud [25] and Smart Watts [26] in
Germany focus on the information and communication technologies
(ICT) that enable P2P energy sharing. TransActive Grid in the US [22]
and National Lifestyle Villages in Australia [27] adopt an emerging
“blockchain” technology to establish a decentralized but trustable P2P
energy trading platform, so that the cost regarding involving an inter-
media is able to be saved. Blockchain technology is a disruptive dis-
tributed information and computing paradigm that is able to create a
trustable trading and billing environment without a centralized au-
thority [28]. Blockchain technology is considered as a promising en-
abler in energy industry [29] and is able to support P2P energy sharing
[30].
The rapid development of P2P energy sharing in the practical world
highlights the importance of the research on relevant topics and
methods, including the simulation and evaluation method studied in
this paper.
3. Multiagent-based simulation framework for P2P energy sharing
This section describes a general multiagent-based simulation fra-
mework for P2P energy sharing and two heuristic techniques for fa-
cilitating convergence of simulation with a last-defence mechanism to
deal with the divergence. Firstly, a brief introduction on P2P energy
sharing is provided. After that, the multiagent-based simulation fra-
mework is presented in detail with the description for its necessity and
components as well as the discussion of convergence issues. Note that
the simulation results provide the basis for calculating the values of the
evaluation indexes that are described in Section 4.
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3.1. P2P energy sharing paradigm and mechanisms
P2P energy sharing involves novel technologies and business models
at the demand-side of power systems, which is able to manage the in-
creasing connection of DERs.
As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), in the conventional market paradigm,
prosumers and consumers trade with retailers (the same retailer or
diﬀerent ones) independently based on their net consumption. For
prosumers, when its consumption is greater than its generation, a
prosumer buys the deﬁcit electricity from a retailer at a retail price.
When the consumption is less than the generation, the prosumer sells
the surplus electricity to the retailer at an export price speciﬁed in the
feed-in tariﬀ (FIT) scheme.
However, in order to encourage prosumers to consume and balance
distributed generation on site as much as possible, it is a common
practice in many countries to set the export price in the FIT scheme
lower than the retail price. This fact motivates the prosumers try
sharing their surplus energy directly with their neighbours to seek
higher revenues, which results in the so-called P2P energy sharing
paradigm as shown in Fig. 1(b). In the P2P energy sharing paradigm,
the prosumers and consumers ﬁrst share their generation and con-
sumption in a local market at an internal price, and then trade with a
retailer to cover the remaining electricity deﬁcit or surplus. The internal
price is usually set between the export price and the retail price, so that
each prosumer or consumer, no matter it is an electricity seller or
buyer, beneﬁts from the P2P energy sharing. Note that consumers can
be seen as a special type of prosumers who do not own any local gen-
eration. Therefore, for convenience, both prosumers and consumers are
collectively referred as prosumers in the rest of the paper. Detailed
market rules in the P2P energy sharing paradigm are collectively
termed as “P2P energy sharing mechanism”.
P2P energy sharing can be carried out among prosumers in a mi-
crogrid or a part of distribution network (referred to as “energy sharing
region (ESR)” in this paper), supervised by a market operator (named
“energy sharing coordinator”, short as “coordinator”, in this paper). A
coordinator is usually needed in P2P energy sharing practice due to two
reasons. First of all, a coordinator is needed to specify the rules for
trading and supervise the energy sharing activities. The rules include
the core pricing model and implementation process, as well as other
relevant rules to guarantee the interests of every participant. Secondly,
a trading platform as well as the associated metering and billing me-
chanisms needs to be provided and operated by a coordinator, based on
which P2P energy sharing is able to be conducted. To the best of our
knowledge, all the existing P2P energy sharing studies and practical
projects involve coordinators [13–27], although in some decentralized
blockchain-based projects the coordinators are played by machine
codes rather than conventional intermedia run by manpower
[22,27,30].
3.2. Multiagent-based simulation framework
P2P energy sharing mechanisms are evaluated based on the actual
outcomes they lead to, including the power and energy exchange and
the corresponding cash ﬂows within the ESR and between the ESR and
the retailer. However, in many cases, feasibility studies need to be
conducted before a mechanism can be implemented. Moreover, simu-
lation results are the basis of assessing the strengths and drawbacks of a
mechanism during its development stage. Therefore, a simulation fra-
mework is necessary.
3.2.1. Framework overview
A multiagent system (MAS) includes multiple autonomous agents
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(b) P2P energy sharing paradigm 
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Fig. 1. Conventional and P2P energy sharing paradigms.
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which interact, negotiate and cooperate with each other to achieve
their individual objectives. MAS is considered suitable for conducting
modelling and simulation tasks with ﬂexible and extensible architecture
in power engineering, as identiﬁed by the Multi-Agent Systems
Working Group of IEEE Power and Energy Society [31]. Therefore, MAS
is suitable for simulating the behaviours of the multiple prosumers that
behave autonomously to maximise their individual beneﬁts in P2P
energy sharing mechanisms [32,33].
The overview of the proposed multiagent-based simulation frame-
work is illustrated in Fig. 2. This framework includes three types of
agents and three corresponding models. The agents are the energy
sharing coordinator agent (CA), the prosumer agents (PAs) and the
retailer agent (RA). The three models include (1) the pricing model in
the CA to calculate and issue the internal price based on the bids of the
PAs, (2) the decision-making model in the PAs to schedule the con-
sumption and/or generation and produce the corresponding bids, and
(3) the implementation model that speciﬁes the type and rules of the
interaction process between the CA and PAs.
The architectures and models of the agents are described in the
following sub-sections. Note that they are described in a general and
abstract way to highlight the major structure, functionalities and input/
output relationship. A concrete example with detailed mathematical models
and rules in the context of GB power system will be presented in Section 5.
3.2.2. Prosumer agents and decision-making model
Prosumer agents represent the autonomous prosumers in P2P en-
ergy sharing. Referring to the abstract architecture for agents described
in [34], the set of prosumer agents is denoted as
 = …PA PA PA{ , , , }N1 2 (1)
where N is the number of prosumers participating in the P2P energy
sharing. Each agent perceives its environment to collect information
needed for decision-making. The environment of a prosumer agent is
denoted as
 = p A D P{ , , , }PA internal renewable (2)
where pinternal represents the set of internal prices in the P2P energy
sharing mechanism; A is the set of parameters of the electrical devices
(i.e. appliances, energy storage systems and distributed generators); D
is the set of demand of the prosumer (e.g. hot water use throughout the
day); Prenewable is the set of power output of uncontrollable renewable
generation owned by the prosumer. The environment actually describes
the input data set of a prosumer agent, and the data can be provided by
both external and internal entities such as the coordinator and the
energy management system of the prosumer.
Based on the information perceived from the environment, the
prosumer agent schedules its electrical devices to minimise its elec-
tricity cost/maximise its revenues in the P2P energy sharing. This
process is simulated by the decision-making model, which is abstractly
described as follows:
=
⩽
p P x
f x A D
h x A D
Cost
s t
min ( , , )
. . ( , , ) 0
( , , ) 0
T
internal renewable
(3)
where T is the set of time steps considered throughout the scheduling
horizon; x is the decision variables, which are the operational status of
the controllable electrical devices (e.g. ON/OFF status of washing ma-
chines, heating power of an electric water heater, etc.); Cost is a func-
tion of internal electricity price, renewable generation output and op-
erational status of the electrical devices, of which the value is the total
electricity cost throughout the scheduling horizon; f and h are the
equality and inequality constraints that consider device physical limits
and prosumer satisfaction. Detailed examples of Cost, f and h in
Formula (3) refer to Appendix A.1.
Note that although the decision-making model is presented as an
optimization problem, besides using optimization algorithms (e.g. in-
terior point method, genetic algorithm, etc.) to solve it, it can also be
realised as heuristic rules, such as those in Ref. [14]. It is also worth
noting that in some cases the internal price, electricity demand and
renewable generation output for future time steps cannot be obtained
directly, and thus auxiliary forecast models are then needed to derive
this information, based on the corresponding historical data, to support
the decision-making model, such as those in Ref. [32].
The decision-making model derives the actions that a prosumer
agent takes, which include the control signals for the controllable
electrical devices, the energy bid (i.e. the resulting load proﬁle over the
scheduling horizon) and the price bid (e.g. the ascending cost plot of the
generation units for economic dispatch as described in Ref. [15]) to be
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Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed multiagent-based simulation framework.
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submitted to the coordinator agent. Therefore, the set of actions of the
prosumer agent is denoted as
 = x e p{ , ,[ ]}PA bid bid (4)
where ebid and pbid represent the energy bid and price bid, respectively.
Note that in some mechanisms only energy bid is needed [16,17], so the
pbid is put into a bracket to show it is optional.
To summarize, the abstract architecture of a prosumer agent is il-
lustrated in Fig. 3.
3.2.3. Coordinator agent and pricing model
The responsibility of the coordinator agent is mainly twofold: one is
to receive the bids from the prosumer agents and issue internal price
back to them, managing the local energy trading within the energy
sharing region; the other is to trade with the retailer on behalf of the
whole energy sharing region to purchase or sell electricity to balance
the energy deﬁcit or surplus in the region. Note that some coordinators
also take care of physical network constraints within their energy
sharing regions, but this is out of the research scope of this paper in
which the coordinator is limited as a local market operator rather than
a system operator.
Therefore, the environment of the coordinator agent is denoted as
 = p e p{ , , }CA external bid bid (5)
where pexternal represents the electricity price at which the coordinator
agent trades with the retailer, including the prices at which the co-
ordinator buys and sells the electricity from and to the retailer (termed
as “retail price” and “export price” respectively in this paper). Note that
in this paper the retail and export prices are considered as non-dynamic
ones, i.e. the prices are known exactly by the coordinator beforehand
and will not change with the amount of power and energy exchanged in
real time. This is the current status in many countries such as the UK
and China.
Taking the information in the environment as input, the coordinator
agent runs the pricing model to generate the internal trading price to be
issued to the prosumer agents. The pricing model is described as:
=p p e pPricing ( , , )
T
internal external bid bid
(6)
where Pricing is the abstract function for generating the internal price.
Major contribution of many existing work lies in the delicate design of
this function, such as Ref. [16,17].
The actions taken by the coordinator agent include the internal
price issued as well as the amount of electricity traded with the retailer.
The action set is denoted as
 = p e{ , }CA internal exchange (7)
where eexchange denotes the energy traded with the retailer.
The architecture of the coordinator agent is summarized in Fig. 4.
3.2.4. Implementation model
The implementation model speciﬁes the trading process between
the coordinator agent and the prosumer agents, i.e. the bidding and
pricing procedure during P2P energy sharing. According to the number
of iterations needed to derive the internal price, there are one-shot
implementation and iterative implementation. As presented in Section
3.2.2, the bid from a prosumer agent can include both energy bid and
price bid, or only energy bid. The implementation model may also set
additional regulations for the bidding process for improving the con-
vergence performance or reducing the risk of market power exercise
[15]. Detailed realisation of the implementation model will be de-
monstrated in Section 5.
3.2.5. Retailer agent
The retailer agent represents the retailer, acting as a passive agent
which sells/buys electricity to/from the energy sharing coordinator
agent on its requested amount at pre-announced retail/export prices.
Note that it is assumed that the retailer does not adopt dynamic prices
associated with the price ﬂuctuation in the wholesale market. This as-
sumption is consistent with the present practice in most regions of
many countries such as GB and China.
Also note that the retailer can exercise demand response measures,
such as direct load control, to actively interact with the coordinator and
prosumers, but that is not considered in this paper. Although prosumers
have been considered with demand response capabilities in some P2P
energy sharing studies [17] and retailers have been considered to ex-
ercise demand response measures in some other studies without P2P
energy sharing considerations [32,35,36], there have been no known
studies in which retailers excise demand response measures in P2P
energy sharing.
It is worth pointing out that how to design P2P energy sharing
mechanisms at the presence of an active retailer who adopts dynamic
Fig. 3. Abstract architecture of a prosumer agent.
Fig. 4. Abstract architecture of a coordinator agent.
Y. Zhou et al. Applied Energy 222 (2018) 993–1022
998
prices or exercises demand response measures is still an open question
and no known existing studies have addressed it. With an active re-
tailer, all the existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms need to be re-
designed because they all assumed that the retailer just passively pro-
vide electricity at pre-announced prices. Furthermore, an active retailer
will be a player with very strong market power in P2P energy sharing
compared to common prosumers, and thus additional rules need to be
made to limit the market power of the retailer and protect the interests
of prosumers. This is an interesting topic for future research but out of
the scope of this paper.
In the paradigm shown in Fig. 2, the coordinator negotiates with the
retailer on behalf of all the prosumers to buy/sell electricity for energy
balance within the energy sharing region. P2P energy sharing in grid-
connected microgrids with only one point of common coupling (PCC)
follows this paradigm, because the physical network structure requires
that the prosumers have to share their energy with each other ﬁrst and
then interact with the retailer in form of aggregated power [14–17].
Nevertheless, in some scenarios, where the prosumers are dis-
tributed in a low-voltage distribution network and virtually form an
energy sharing region, the prosumers can directly negotiate with the
retailer just as what they do with other prosumers. However, in this
paper, it is assumed that the retailer passively oﬀers/purchases un-
limited power at pre-announced retail/export prices, and the export
prices are assumed lower than retail prices, as all the known P2P energy
sharing studies did [14–17]. Given this assumption, the scenarios where
the prosumers directly negotiate with the retailer are equivalent with
the paradigm shown in Fig. 2. This is because with this assumption, the
internal prices have to be bounded between the retail and export prices
(as shown in all the known P2P energy sharing mechanisms) and thus
all the prosumers will ﬁrst consider to trade with other prosumers and
last choose to go to the retailer (only when the energy is not balanced)
[14–17].
If the assumption does not hold, i.e. the retailer who participates in
P2P energy sharing will actively adopt dynamic pricing associated with
the wholesale market or exercise demand response measures, the pro-
posed simulation framework deﬁnitely needs to be extended to consider
the direct negotiation between the retailer and prosumers, and to in-
volve the price ﬂuctuation in the wholesale market and other factors
that may aﬀect the retailer’s strategic decisions. However, this topic is
out of the scope of this paper. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
known studies on this topic and thus it is identiﬁed as a possible re-
search direction for the future.
3.3. Convergence of the multiagent-based simulation
With the multiagent-based framework established, the behaviours
of prosumers are able to be simulated under a P2P energy sharing
mechanism that speciﬁes the pricing and implementation models.
However, this has to be based on an important condition: the simula-
tion converges.
Iterative bidding and pricing procedure is usually needed in P2P
energy sharing mechanisms, in which the bids provided by the prosu-
mers would change in response to the dynamic internal price, and this
change will in turn aﬀect the internal price. This fact may lead to an
outcome where the bidding and pricing iteration never ends with an
ultimate internal price. Formally, the convergence is deﬁned as the fact
that the energy bids and internal price values ﬁnally converge to a ﬁxed
point after a ﬁnite number of iterations in the interaction between the
coordinator agent and the prosumer agents. If energy bids and internal
price values are not able to converge to a ﬁxed point after a ﬁnite
number of iterations, the simulation is considered to diverge [37].
Even for one-shot implementation, similar concern exists as well.
The one-shot bidding can be taken as a non-cooperative game played by
all the prosumer agents. Then the existence of Nash equilibrium in the
one-shot bidding corresponds to the convergence state in the iterative
bidding.
Convergence is desired because electricity market designers, in this
case the designers of P2P energy sharing mechanisms, intend to achieve
an eﬀective, eﬃcient and fair allocation of interests among participants
and an desired technical outcome (e.g. reduced peak power and en-
hanced energy balance within energy sharing regions) by the means of
leading participants’ behaviours to expected convergence through the
‘invisible hand’ of the market. If the divergence occurs, there are no
stable outcomes that can be expected, which may result in undesired
economic or technical outcomes with a high probability. That is why
many existing studies tried to prove and achieve convergence for the
market mechanisms they designed [13,15,17,37].
If convergence cannot always be guaranteed, an exit mechanism is
usually designed in P2P energy sharing mechanisms, as that in Ref.
[17], because in real life participants need to settle their trades ﬁnally
and cannot just wait forever, although the speciﬁcs of the exit me-
chanism can vary. For example, in Ref. [17], if the simulation does not
converge when the maximum number of iterations is reached, then the
simulation is forced to exit, and all the prosumers are considered to
directly trade with the retailer individually instead (i.e. P2P energy
sharing is not used given divergence). For the exit mechanism used in
this paper (which will be detailed later in Section 3.3.4), the simulation
is also forced to exit at the maximum number of iterations if not con-
verge, but the status at the last iteration is used for settling trades (i.e.
P2P energy sharing is still used based on the results of the last itera-
tion). The rationale behind this design is that the overall performance
under P2P energy sharing can still be good even if the iteration does not
converge, which will be demonstrated by numerical results in Section
5.2.2.
When conducting the multiagent-based simulation for the existing
P2P energy sharing mechanisms, there are signiﬁcant challenges in
obtaining the convergence/equilibrium state. First of all, some existing
mechanisms, such as those in Ref. [16], neither speciﬁed an im-
plementation model nor provided any justiﬁcation on the convergence
of the mechanisms. Although some mechanisms, as that in Ref. [17],
provided speciﬁc implementation model and proof of the existence of a
ﬁxed point, the implementation model could not guarantee that the
ﬁxed point is able to be found every time, and this depended on demand
response participation level. Moreover, sometimes some existing me-
chanisms are extended to be used in broader scenarios in which their
convergence is no longer guaranteed.
Faced with the above challenges, two heuristic techniques (step
length control and learning process involvement) are proposed to fa-
cilitate the achievement of convergence, and a last-defence mechanism
is devised to cope with the cases where it cannot converge in P2P en-
ergy sharing.
3.3.1. Step length control
This technique limits the number or ramping rate of the changing
energy/price bids to increase the chance to ﬁnd the convergence and
try to avoid the “oscillation” (i.e. iterative large changes) between the
bids and the internal price. It is a common technique in simulation
practice to adjust the length of steps for better convergence [13,38].
Taking the energy bidding process in iterative implementation as an
example, the step length control can be achieved by requiring each
prosumer agent to limit the ramping rate of the bid at each iteration:
− ⩽ ⩽ + =− − −e e e e e ermpmax( Δ, ) min( Δ, ) Δ ·| |i i i i1bid min bid 1bid max 1bid (8)
where i is the index of the current iteration during which the bid de-
cision needs to be made, and rmp represents the ramping rate that takes
a non-negative value. Formula (8) can be basically interpreted as fol-
lows: the value of the current energy bid, e ,ibid should be bounded in a
range, − +− −e e[ Δ, Δ],i i1bid 1bid which is speciﬁed by the ramping rate and the
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bid of the previous iteration with = −ermpΔ ·| |.i 1bid Besides, if the upper
bound speciﬁed in this way exceeds the maximum limit of the energy
bid e ,max it should be reduced to emax by having +−e emin( Δ, ).i 1bid max
Similar operation applies to the case of the lower bound. Formula (8)
should act as an additional constraint in the decision-making model (as
described by Formula (3)) of each prosumer agent.
The step length control can also be achieved by limiting the number
of the bids allowed to be changed at each iteration. That is,
 = ∈ ⊂−e e ji j i j i,bid 1,bid forbid (9)
where j is the index of prosumer agent.  forbid is the set of prosumer
agents who are forbidden to change their energy bids at the i th itera-
tion. The number of the elements in  ,forbid i.e. | |,forbid is pre-de-
ﬁned. During simulation, Formula (9) should be added to the decision-
making model (as described by Formula (3)) of jth prosumer agent to
make it function.
The reasoning behind this measure is that if all the prosumers are
allowed to change their bids at each iteration, the change in power and
energy within the region may be too large so that the price may os-
cillate heavily and it is more diﬃcult for the simulation to converge.
Therefore, only a portion of prosumers are allowed to change their bids
at each iteration to reduce the magnitude of total power and energy
changes within the region. For example, in Algorithm 1 – Iterative
Scheme of Ref. [13], at each iteration only one device is allowed to
change its power consumption to guarantee the convergence.
At each iteration, the elements of  ,forbid i.e. the prosumers who
are forbidden to change their bids, are evenly randomly selected by the
coordinator to ensure the fairness among prosumers. The number of
prosumers forbidden aﬀects the magnitude of energy and price change
in the region at each iteration, thus potentially aﬀecting the con-
vergence performance. The eﬀects of this measure with diﬀerent por-
tions of prosumers forbidden were examined and presented in Case 1-2
of Section 5.
Note that the two types of step length control patterns are able to be
used in a combined way to obtain smaller step limits. That is, one can
ﬁrst limit the number of bids allowed to be changed as described in
Formula (9), and then limit the change of the allowable bids by using
Formula (8). For example, a broader ramping rate, denoted as ′rmp , can
be deﬁned, indicating that ′ ×rmp 100% of the bids are allowed to be
changed and the change for each bid should not exceed ± ′ ×rmp 100%.
Detailed analysis on why and how the step length control is able to
facilitate convergence refers to Appendix B.
3.3.2. Learning process involvement
Another technique is to involve a learning process in the decision-
making model of each prosumer agent. Traditionally, as described in
Formula (3), the objective of each prosumer agent is to maximise its
economic beneﬁts given the current market environment (i.e. the in-
ternal price at the current iteration), while with a learning process, it is
assumed that the prosumer agents make decisions not only considering
the current situation but also referring to the historical experience and/
or the forecast for the future. This assumption is basically sensible be-
cause the prosumer agents, either human beings or computer programs,
can have the intelligence to learn from the past and predict the future
when making decisions. If the learning process is designed properly, the
convergence of the simulation is able to be enhanced.
For example, in Ref. [15], a 1-D recursive least squares based
learning process is adopted for each prosumer agent to estimate the
internal price based on which the bidding decision is made. With this
learning process assumption, the simulation is proven to converge but
does not guarantee a boundary on the error. In another example as
presented in Ref. [39], reinforcement learning is used in the decision
making process of the agents to enhance the convergence of the
diagonalization algorithm, in which the knowledge on the success of
the agents’ past behaviour is used to adjust the supply oﬀers. In this
paper, a modiﬁed reinforcement learning based on the basic idea in Ref.
[39] is devised as a technique to enhance the simulation convergence.
Speciﬁcally, if the technique is adopted, the objective function in the
decision-making model of each prosumer agent, as shown in Formula
(3), is replaced with the following formula:
̂p P xCostmin ( , , ).
T
internal renewable
(10)
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In Formula (11)–(13), i represents the index of the current iteration;
γ represents the learning rate that takes value in [0,1];W is the number
of the previous iterations which the prosumer agent considers to make
its decision; ωk is the weighting factor for the internal price of the k th
iteration; pmax
internal and pmin
internal are the upper and the lower bounds of the
internal price, which equal to the retail price and export price (with the
retailer) respectively in most P2P energy sharing mechanisms; μ is a
random number ranging from 0 to 1; ′Incomek represents the income of
the prosumer at k th iteration with an oﬀset; U is the oﬀset constant
which is deﬁned in Formula (13) and intended to make all the incomes
considered in Formula (12) to be non-negative; ε is a very small positive
number to avoid the denominator of Formula (12) to equal to zero in
some rare cases.
As shown in Formula (10), the prosumer agent makes its decision
based on an estimation of the internal price which is a combination of
the current price, the weighted sum of the previous prices and a random
adjustment as described in Formula (11). In the proposed learning
process as shown in Formula (10)–(13), there are two modiﬁcations
compared to the existing one in Ref. [39] and the corresponding ra-
tionales are as follows.
First of all, the prosumer income (i.e. the opposite number of the
cost calculated in Formula (3)) in the weighting factor calculation
Formula (12) is replaced with the income with an oﬀset as calculated in
Formula (13). This is because in Ref. [39] only producers were con-
sidered so that the income was always non-negative. However, in the
P2P energy sharing, the prosumers may also consume much electricity,
which may result in a negative income. Therefore, an oﬀset constant is
introduced to increase all the incomes up to non-negative values, so
that each weighting factor takes values within [0,1] with the sum of
them being exactly 1.
The other modiﬁcation is the introduction of the random term (the
third term) in the price estimation Formula (11). With this term, the
agent makes decisions based not only on the current market informa-
tion and the past experience but also on a random attempt. The ratio-
nale behind the involvement of the random attempt is that, if an agent
always makes decisions based on the optimal decisions in the past only,
it will be easier to fall into local optimums and be more vulnerable in a
variable market environment. The random attempt at each iteration is
able to broaden the agent’s experience, and thus potentially helps the
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agent to make better decisions in the iteration process. Similar ideas are
usually applied in intelligent optimization algorithms, such as the
random numbers in the velocity update equations in particle swarm
optimization (PSO) [40].
The involvement of the learning process can enhance the con-
vergence of the simulation because each prosumer agent makes more
stable decisions with the consideration of the historical experience, as
demonstrated in Ref. [39]. Detailed analysis on this issue refers to
Appendix B. Furthermore, a decreasing learning rate in the process of
iteration can be used instead of a constant learning rate to signiﬁcantly
enhance the convergence or even guarantee a convergence, although
still no boundary on the error will be guaranteed (i.e. the ﬁnal con-
vergence obtained in this way may be far from the feasible optimum).
3.3.3. Practical implications of the two techniques
The previous two sub-sections (Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2) discuss the
convergence techniques from the simulation point of view. However,
the purpose of simulation is to reﬂect and assess the reality, and thus it
will be pointless if the simulation with the techniques deviates from the
reality. Therefore, it is of great importance to discuss the practical
implications of the two convergence techniques.
The ﬁrst technique, step length control, limits the ramping rate of
the bids in the bidding process. In practice, this can be realised by the
coordinator through setting bidding rules in the implementation model,
as described in Section 3.2.4, in a P2P energy sharing mechanism. For
example, the mechanism can achieve this by requiring that the co-
ordinator should reject any bid that exceeds the prescribed ramping
rate so that all the prosumers have to obey the ramping rate limit.
Therefore, the step length control technique in simulation is able to
suggest better bidding rules in the implementation model in practice.
The second technique, learning process involvement, models the
decision-making process of the prosumers in a more practical way by
considering the learning and predicting capability of theirs. However,
for a real population of prosumers, the learning process is somehow an
inherent attribute of theirs, rather than something that can be easily
changed from the outside. In this sense, strictly speaking, the parameter
values in Formula (11), such as the learning rate γ and the learning
windowW , should be identiﬁed based on ﬁeld investigation and actual
behaviour data of the prosumers, rather than be assigned some value to
derive better convergence in simulation. A number of studies on elec-
tricity markets used learning-based multiagent methodology, in which
the learning rates were usually speciﬁed heuristically and sensitivity
analysis was conducted in some studies [39,41–45]. However, no
practical ﬁeld test has been found on this issue either in academia or
industry to the best of our knowledge. In spite of this, to study what
learning process can best improve the convergence is still of some
signiﬁcance, which reveals the desired outcome when designing the
incentive mechanisms.
3.3.3.1. Remarks on P2P energy sharing with the two techniques compared
with distributed optimization approaches. It is worth noting that the
proposed heuristic techniques for facilitating convergence somehow
interfere the local decision-making process of prosumers. Speciﬁcally,
the step length control technique limits a prosumer’ decision domain by
imposing a ramping rate limit for the bids, and the learning process
involvement technique assumes certain decision-making logic for
prosumers. Considering this fact, the following three questions rise:
(1) Are the techniques necessary?
(2) Will the techniques undermine the unique features of P2P energy
sharing, compared to distributed optimization approaches?
(3) Compared with P2P energy sharing with the proposed heuristic
techniques, can we say that distributed optimization approaches are
better, considering they may have theoretically veriﬁed
convergence properties and the advantage of converging towards a
social welfare maximizing solution through a specially designed
cost function?
The answer to the ﬁrst question is that, the techniques are not es-
sential parts of P2P energy sharing mechanisms, and they are just ad-
ditional measures to help facilitate convergence and had to be used in
the case studies of this paper. They are not essential because if the P2P
energy sharing mechanisms were well designed with very good con-
vergence performance, then the simulation and evaluation could be
conducted smoothly by using the multiagent-based simulation and
evaluation system proposed in this paper, without imposing any addi-
tional techniques for facilitating convergence. However, the fact is that
the convergence performance of all the existing mechanisms examined
in this paper is so poor that it will be pointless to simulate and evaluate
them directly because they will just diverge in most cases. Therefore,
the heuristic adjustment techniques were proposed to facilitate the
convergence for better evaluation, as an additional contribution (but
not key focus) of this paper, although they indeed have the drawback of
interfering local decision-making process of prosumers to some extent.
Regarding the second question, The P2P energy sharing paradigm is
claimed to be distinguished from distributed optimization approaches
in terms of two features, i.e. ‘prosumers have full control of their own
DERs’ and ‘no additional incentives are needed to motivate prosumers
to participate (because every prosumer in P2P energy sharing makes
decisions only to maximise its own interests)’. First of all, we note again
that the proposed heuristic adjustment techniques are not essential but
just additional measures to facilitate convergence. If P2P energy me-
chanisms were designed with good convergence performance, the
heuristic techniques might not need to be used, so that the two dis-
tinguishing features are able to be kept. Secondly, although the step
length control technique indeed weakens the full control of prosumers
over their DERs, this conclusion may not apply to the learning process
involvement technique. If a learning rate is imposed from the external
by the coordinator, the full control is indeed interfered; but if the
learning rate is just a description of the reality (e.g. a group of prosu-
mers intrinsically having that learning rate are aggregated to conduct
P2P energy sharing), then there will be no point to say that the full
control is interfered. Last but not least, even if the full control is in-
terfered, it is interfered indirectly and fairly, i.e. the coordinator does
not control any device directly but just issues uniﬁed rules (e.g. bid
change limitation in the step length control technique) fairly to ev-
eryone. Moreover, the other distinguishing feature of P2P energy
sharing (i.e. self-motivated) always holds, because even with any of the
two heuristic techniques, each prosumer still makes its decision only to
maximise its individual interest, but this is not always the case for
distributed optimization approaches, as noted in Ref. [13].
Regarding the third question, distributed optimization approaches
cannot always guarantee the convergence in many cases (including the
cases studied in this paper), and thus heuristic measures actually have
to be involved anyway. The cases studied in this paper include EVs and
TCLs, which are reschedulable loads that may involve inter-temporal
demand shift. As a result, the decision-making model of a prosumer, as
detailed in Appendix A.1, is nonconvex [46]. However, most existing
distributed optimization approaches, including LR and augmented LR
based approaches such as ADMM and auxiliary problem principle
(APP), are able to guarantee the convergence only if the problems are
convex [47]. Therefore, even for distributed optimization approaches,
heuristic modiﬁcations are inevitable for the cases considered in this
paper, and little theory exists to guide the search of near-optimal fea-
sible solutions [48]. Additionally, the step length control technique
proposed in this paper actually accidently have some similarities, in
terms of high-level ideas, with the LR heuristics for the distributed
optimization approach described in Ref. [48], although focusing on
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problems at diﬀerent scales. It is thus an interesting research topic for
the future to see if the proposed heuristic techniques can be improved
through observing some ideas from the studies in the ﬁeld of distributed
optimization.
Finally, regarding converging towards a social welfare maximising
solution, P2P energy sharing may be able to achieve that as well, but
again, it is mostly the responsibility of P2P energy sharing mechanism
designers. A good mechanism is expected to lead to good social welfare,
by providing a smart market design that motivates prosumers to behave
right for the whole society at the same time they pursue their personal
interests. This is somehow out of the scope of this paper. The evaluation
method proposed in this paper is able to evaluate whether and how well
they achieve that, but not to ﬁgure out how they can achieve that.
3.3.4. Last-defence mechanism
Although the techniques are generally able to enhance the con-
vergence of the simulation for P2P energy sharing, there are no guar-
antee that they are always able to ﬁnd the convergence. The reasons
may be that the convergence does not exist at all, or that it is just not
found although it exists (e.g. Ref. [17] proves the existence of con-
vergence by applying Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem, but the algorithm
it provides cannot guarantee that the convergence is able to be found in
every case). Therefore, a last-defence mechanism needs to be estab-
lished to deal with the situation where all the other eﬀorts for reaching
convergence have failed. Note that how many cases in which we need
the last-defence mechanism when a convergence exists, mostly depends
on how well the P2P energy sharing mechanism that we are evaluating
is designed. To a great extent, that is not the responsibility and core
focus of this paper.
The proposed last-defence mechanism is just to end the simulation
after a pre-deﬁned ﬁnite number of iterations, no matter the con-
vergence is achieved or not. If the simulation ends in that way, the
status at the last iteration is used in this paper to calculate the index
values for evaluation. It is fair to do so because in practice, the bidding
and pricing iteration cannot carry on forever and there is a deadline at
which the iteration has to stop and the trading is settled.
In the proposed last-defence mechanism, the maximum number of
iterations allowed is an important parameter, and should be chosen to
be large enough so that the simulation is not forced to be stopped before
it converges. However, there is no way to decide a perfect maximum
number of iterations a priori, because we never know whether a con-
vergence exists or how many iterations are needed to reach it until we
actually reach it. Therefore, heuristic values are used in this paper. The
sensitivity analysis of this parameter has been provided to show its
impact and support the choice of its value in Section 5.2.5.
3.3.5. Remarks on strategic behaviours of prosumers
In P2P energy sharing, strategic behaviours of prosumers are of
great signiﬁcance, not only directly aﬀecting how much interest a
prosumer is able to obtain, but also shaping the overall economic and
technical outcome and performance of the P2P energy sharing me-
chanism within the region. Remarks are presented as follows to discuss
strategic behaviours of prosumers in the proposed multiagent-based
simulation framework and broader P2P energy sharing background.
As shown in the decision-making model of a prosumer agent in the
proposed multiagent-based simulation framework (Section 3.2.2), a
prosumer is considered to make its decision just to maximise its own
interests. From this point, the bidding process formulated in this paper
is actually a non-cooperative game. If the simulation converges, which
means that nobody changes its bid because no more beneﬁts can be
achieved by doing this, a Nash equilibrium is found. If the simulation
does not converge within the maximum number of iterations, no Nash
equilibrium is found, and the trading is tackled as speciﬁed in the last-
defence mechanism (Section 3.3.4). Note that whether Nash
equilibriums exist and can be found largely depends on the design of
the P2P energy sharing mechanism under evaluation.
Actually, the above work presented in this paper is just a small part
of the many issues regarding strategic behaviours of prosumers, and a
number of topics remain to be further explored.
First of all, the interactions among prosumers can range from in-
tense competition to collusion, but this paper just considers the com-
plete competition case by modelling the problem as a non-cooperative
game. Uncompetitive situations may happen, and need to be modelled
and studied as cooperative games or Stackelberg games. Even in com-
petitive situations, a number of other “conjectural variations” (i.e. the
assumption a prosumer makes about its rivals’ response to its actions)
can be adopted [49], besides the one used in this paper, which assumes
that rival prosumers make their decisions assuming that other prosu-
mers will not change theirs.
Moreover, in the case studies in Section 5, the prosumers are con-
sidered as price takers, as detailed in Appendix A.1. Although it is a
common assumption especially in P2P energy sharing studies, it will
make more sense to assume some prosumers as price makers in some
cases [5], especially when the prosumers under consideration have
large generation or demand capacity and will aﬀect the market price a
lot.
Last but not least, the market power of prosumers are not examined
in this paper. Some capable prosumers may intentionally manipulate
the market price by taking advantage of the market rules, pricing me-
chanisms, their own operational parameters or even the network con-
ditions if the physical power networks are considered in the future [42].
Market power of prosumers may aﬀect the performance of a P2P energy
sharing mechanism, and is thus an important aspect that needs to be
considered and evaluated.
All the above topics to be explored are interesting and of great
signiﬁcance, and noted as potential research directions in the future.
4. Evaluation indexes for P2P energy sharing
This section presents the indexes proposed to evaluate the perfor-
mance of P2P energy sharing mechanisms. Three economic indexes and
three technical indexes are deﬁned, which are then normalised and
synthesized as a systemic index to evaluate the overall performance.
Note that the values of the indexes are calculated based on the simu-
lation results derived by the multiagent framework described in Section
3 or on the actual outcome if the P2P energy sharing mechanisms have
been implemented in practice.
4.1. Economic indexes
4.1.1. Value tapping index
The value tapping index measures the overall beneﬁts of the whole
population within the P2P energy sharing region, reﬂecting how much
cost-saving potential has been tapped and how much more still remains
to be explored by adopting a certain P2P energy sharing mechanism.
As presented in Section 3.1, the diﬀerence between the retail price
and the export price between the retailer and prosumers provides the
fundamental incentive for prosumers to participate in P2P energy
sharing. Each prosumer can beneﬁt, either acting as an electricity
producer or consumer, by agreeing an internal price between the retail
and export price. However, obviously the total beneﬁts brought by P2P
energy sharing have an upper limit, at which the prosumers share their
local generation and consumption to the maximum extent that results in
the minimum total energy cost paid to the retailer. Therefore, the
maximum possible beneﬁts, i.e. the maximum value potential of P2P
energy sharing, are speciﬁed by
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where L and G are the set of devices that consume and produce elec-
tricity, and l and g represent the electricity consumed and generated
respectively (l is positive and g is negative). Note that for an energy
storage system, when it is charging, it belongs to L, and when it is
discharging, it belongs to G. F and H are the union of the f and g in
Formula (3), i.e. the union of the device and user requirement limits of
each device of each prosumer.
If we compare the total beneﬁts of all the prosumers under some
P2P energy sharing mechanism with the maximum value identiﬁed by
Formula (14), we are able to have an idea about to what extent the
adopted mechanism has tapped the potential value among the prosu-
mers and how much space has been left for further improvement.
Therefore, the following value tapping index is deﬁned:
= −−VI
value value
value value
mechanism ref
max ref (17)
in which valuemechanism represents the total income of prosumers under
the adopted P2P energy sharing mechanism, and valueref represents
total income of prosumers in the non-P2P conventional paradigm where
each prosumer trades with the retailer separately as illustrated in
Fig. 1(a).
It is worth noting that the value tapping index, V I, derived by
Formula (17) is a normalised index without units, which represents a
proportion. The larger the index value is, the higher the overall income
of the prosumers is, i.e. the higher value has been tapped. With the
normalised index, it is convenient to compare the overall beneﬁts under
diﬀerent P2P energy sharing mechanisms and ﬁgure out the potential
value left to be further tapped. The normalised index is also essential for
the further synthesization of multiple indexes.
In addition, it is also worth noting that the V I takes value in [0,1],
unless <value valuemechanism ref . If <value value ,mechanism ref it means that
the total income under the adopted P2P energy sharing mechanism is
even less than that in the non-P2P conventional paradigm, and then V I
takes negative values, which rarely happens as shown in Section 5.3.2.
4.1.2. Participation willingness index
The participation willingness index measures the percentage of the
prosumers who obtain more beneﬁts after participating in certain P2P
energy sharing mechanism, reﬂecting the overall participation will-
ingness of the whole population.
Besides the overall beneﬁts of the whole population as evaluated by
Formula (17), the beneﬁts of each single prosumer counts as well. If the
energy cost of a prosumer under some P2P energy sharing mechanism is
higher than that under direct trading with the retailer, the prosumer
will have the incentive to exit the P2P energy sharing mechanism and
seek to trade with the retailer directly. In this case, it is diﬃcult for the
mechanism to keep the population of the participants. Therefore, the
participation willingness in a P2P energy sharing mechanism can be
measured by the proportion of the prosumers who have lower energy
cost compared to that under direct trading with the retailer:
=PI N
N
LowerCost
(18)
where NLowerCost represents the number of prosumers who have lower
energy cost in P2P energy sharing than that under direct trading with
the retailer; N is the total number of prosumers participating in the P2P
energy sharing mechanism.
Note that the index value calculated by Formula (17) is also nor-
malised in [0,1], with higher value representing higher participation
willingness.
4.1.3. Equality index
The equality index measures the income distribution among the
prosumers in the adopted P2P energy sharing mechanisms, reﬂecting
the income equality within the population.
The equality is an important issue in many aspects of human society
and the energy sector is not an exception. Strong inequality aﬀects the
harmony within the community, and hinders the acceptance and
adoption of the P2P energy sharing mechanisms among prosumers.
Borrowing the idea of Gini coeﬃcient in economics, the relative mean
absolute diﬀerence of the levelled up income of the prosumers is de-
ﬁned as the index to measure the inequality:
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where ′Income represents the levelled up income that is deﬁned to level
the income up to positive values. The deﬁnition of ′Income in Formula
(19) is similar to Formula (13), but deﬁned among the prosumers rather
than throughout the previous iterations:
′ = ⎧⎨⎩
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n n N
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Note that the value of IEI also ranges from 0 to 1, according to the
property of Gini coeﬃcient. The larger the index is, the larger the in-
equality is. The inequality index, IEI, is transformed to equality index,
EI by
= −EI IEI1 (21)
to be consistent with the other two economic indexes V I and PI in
terms of being better with higher values. This is a preparation for fur-
ther synthesization which will be detailed in Section 4.3.
4.2. Technical indexes
Technical indexes are deﬁned to measure the performance that is
concerned from the perspective of power systems. Three indexes are
deﬁned, including energy balance index, power ﬂatness index and self-
suﬃciency index.
4.2.1. Energy balance index
The energy balance index measures the total amount of energy ex-
change with the bulk power grid in both import and export directions,
reﬂecting the energy balance of the P2P energy sharing region.
One of the key motives of encouraging P2P energy sharing from the
power systems’ points of view is to facilitate the local consumption of
distributed generation to alleviate the problems brought by its in-
creasing penetration, as discussed in Section 1. Therefore, the energy
balance within the P2P energy sharing region is considered as an im-
portant index. First of all, the energy imbalance is measured by
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where the numerator is the summation of the energy imbalance (either
surplus or deﬁcit) throughout the considered time horizon, and the
denominator is the total amount of the generation and consumption
throughout the horizon, which is used to normalise the index. Based on
the energy imbalance index, EI I, the energy balance index is deﬁned as
= −EBI EI I1 (23)
which takes value in [0,1]. Similar to other economic indexes deﬁned
earlier, this operation is to make it “the larger, the better” for further
synthesization.
Remarks: Another common used index is local self-consumption,
which measures how much local generation has been consumed on site.
It basically focuses on where the local generation goes (either con-
sumed by local loads or exported to the main grid), but does not care
about how much power is imported from/exported to the main grid. In
comparison, the energy balance index deﬁned in this paper measures
the sum of the absolute value of the net power exchange between the
P2P energy sharing region and the main grid throughout the time
horizon considered, reﬂecting the energy exchange in both import and
export directions. The reason for caring about this is that, large ex-
change power in either import or export direction may be concerned by
the network operator, because large power ﬂow in either direction may
require costly network reinforcement.
Note that the local self-consumption index and energy balance index
are not equivalent to each other. For example, even with a high self-
consumption level, a prosumer may still need to import a large amount
of electricity at times when the local demand is high but local gen-
eration is low, which results in a low energy balance level. Therefore,
the local self-consumption index and energy balance index reﬂects
diﬀerent aspects of performance, and both of them are of practical
meaning. People who conduct the evaluation can choose proper indexes
according to their speciﬁc needs. The evaluation index system proposed
in this paper is open to and compatible with other additional indexes
like local self-consumption index.
4.2.2. Power ﬂatness index
The power ﬂatness index measures peak power considering both
positive and negative directions.
Besides the energy balance, the peak power of the P2P energy
sharing region is another important concern from the perspective of
power systems, because high peak power results in the expensive net-
work reinforcement and heavy burden on the operation of power sys-
tems. Moreover, ﬂatter power proﬁles are able to increase the utilisa-
tion rate and operational eﬃciency of the power equipment. Therefore,
an index is needed to measure the ﬂatness of the power proﬁles in the
P2P energy sharing region.
Traditionally, the ﬂatness of load proﬁles is measured by the peak-
to-average ratio (PAR), which is usually deﬁned as the quotient of the
peak load and average load over a period of time. However, in the P2P
energy sharing region composed of prosumers, the net consumption is
either positive or negative, rather than always being positive.
Therefore, an extended PAR is deﬁned as follows:
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in which both the power surplus and deﬁcit are considered. Based on
the extended PAR, the power ﬂatness index is deﬁned as
= −PFI EPARI
EPARI
1
ref (25)
where EPARIref is used to normalised the index value into the interval
[0,1], which can be chosen as the maximum EPARI when several P2P
energy sharing mechanisms are compared.
4.2.3. Self-suﬃciency index
The self-suﬃciency index measures how much local demand is able
to be supplied by local generation, reﬂecting the dependency of the P2P
energy sharing region on the external bulk power grid.
Self-suﬃciency has been increasingly valued by many communities
in recent years. One consideration is that with higher self-suﬃciency
supported by local generation, the reliability of power supply will be
better guaranteed, in case of power outages in the external power
systems. Another consideration is the so-called “energy autonomy”,
which is considered able to deliver a host of social, ﬁnancial and en-
vironmental beneﬁts [50]. Therefore, the self-suﬃciency in a P2P en-
ergy sharing region is measured as a performance index. First of all, the
proportion of energy relying on import is calculated as
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Based on Formula (26), the self-suﬃciency index is deﬁned as
= −SSI SI I1 . (28)
4.3. Index synthesization
The economic and technical indexes proposed in Section 4.1 and 4.2
are able to evaluate the performance of P2P energy sharing mechanisms
from diﬀerent perspectives. They can also be synthesized for assessing
the overall performance.
All the six individual indexes proposed are normalised, generally
ranging from 0 to 1, and are also deﬁned to be consistent (i.e. the larger
the index value is, the better the performance is). It is now feasible to
use the simple and straightforward weighting factors to synthesize the
indexes. Speciﬁcally, the economic performance index, EPI, is deﬁned
to reﬂect the overall economic performance of P2P energy sharing
mechanisms:
= + +
∑ = ∈ ∈=
EPI α V I α PI α EI
α α w
· · · ,
1, [0,1], {1,2,3}.w w w
1 2 3
1
3
(29)
Similarly, the technical performance index, TPI, is deﬁned to assess
the overall technical performance:
∑
= + +
= ∈ ∈
=
TPI β EBI β PFI β SSI
β β w
· · · ,
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The economic and technical performance index can be further
combined to compose an index to evaluate the overall performance of
P2P energy sharing mechanisms:
∑
= +
= ∈ ∈
=
OPI γ EPI γ TPI
γ γ w
· · ,
1, [0,1], {1,2}.
w
w w
1 2
1
2
(31)
In summary, the hierarchy of the indexes proposed is illustrated in
Fig. 5. The value of the weighting factors can be ﬂexibly chosen to
reﬂect the relative importance of the diﬀerent aspects of the perfor-
mance, according to the speciﬁc need and concerns in practice.
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The six individual indexes proposed in this paper measure and re-
ﬂect diﬀerent but important aspects of technical and economic per-
formance of P2P energy sharing mechanisms, as have already explained
in previous sub-sections for all the indexes. They have successfully ﬁlled
the research gaps identiﬁed in Section 1 of this paper to a great extent.
We note that the proposed index system as shown in Fig. 5 is an open
system, and the index system could be extended by other researchers in
the future.
Remarks: The relationship between the indexes proposed in this
paper is discussed as follows. First of all, the indexes are divided into
two groups, economic index and technical indexes. The former ones
concern the cost / income of the participants in P2P energy sharing,
while the latter ones focus on the technical implications that may be
concerned by electricity network operators or customers. Basically,
economic indexes and technical indexes have diﬀerent focuses, so they
do not have a direct relationship.
Among the economic indexes, the value tapping index measures the
overall cost of the whole population in the P2P energy sharing region,
to evaluate whether and to what extent the adopted P2P energy sharing
mechanism has brought beneﬁts for the whole population. The equality
index further examines how the overall beneﬁts are distributed among
the population. The participation willingness index examines each
single participant to check if the incentive is strong enough to keep the
participant within the adopted P2P energy sharing mechanism.
Although the three economic indexes seem to have some relationship,
to what extent they are correlated with each other varies with speciﬁc
application scenarios and the P2P energy sharing mechanisms adopted.
For example, we cannot assert that higher overall income must lead to
higher income for everybody. Therefore, it is wise to just keep all the
indexes in the evaluation system as shown in Fig. 5, and adjust their
eﬀects by assigning corresponding weight values according to practical
needs and concerns. Similar analysis applies to the technical indexes as
well.
5. Case Study: evaluating P2P energy sharing mechanisms for
residential customers in present and future scenarios of Great
Britain
Three existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms were simulated and
evaluated in present and future scenarios of GB in this paper. The ob-
jectives were to validate the proposed simulation and evaluation
methods, as well as to derive some practical implications on applying
P2P energy sharing in GB.
Speciﬁcally, the three mechanisms evaluated were supply and de-
mand ratio (SDR), mid-market rate (MMR) and bill sharing (BS) me-
chanisms. SDR mechanism established an internal price model for en-
ergy sharing, in which the internal prices are deﬁned as piecewise
function of SDR [17]. MMR mechanism basically sets the internal
trading price as the average of retail and export prices, with an addi-
tional adjustment mechanism for situations where local generation does
not equal to local consumption [16]. BS mechanism a pro rata cost
sharing mechanism, in which the income and cost of each participant
are proportional to its electricity production and consumption [16].
Detailed description and deﬁnition on these three mechanisms refer to
Appendix A.2.
Residential customers in GB were considered to participate in the
chosen mechanisms. Electrical demand and PV generation were mod-
elled by CREST model that incorporates appliance composition, elec-
trical parameters and human occupancy models based on realistic sta-
tistics of GB [51]. The parameters and travelling behaviours of EVs
were obtained from the EV database [52] which is based on realistic GB
statistics as well. Future scenarios were modelled by increased pene-
tration of PV panels and EVs compared to the current baseline.
Note that EVs were considered in future households because there is
a clear trend that EVs will play an important role in future GB [53] as
well as many other countries in the world [54]. Compared to EVs, it is
still not clear whether other energy storage systems, e.g. dedicated
household batteries like Tesla Powerwall [55], will be widely used in
households or not, so they were not included in this case study. In spite
of this, it is worth noting that actually an EV participates in P2P energy
sharing using its batteries, so it can be seen as a special case of battery
energy storage systems so that the implications of this case study can be
extended to battery energy storage systems.
With these settings, the abstract agents and models in the multia-
gent-based simulation framework described in Section 3 were realised
as detailed mathematical models, which refer to Appendix A.
5.1. Case design and simulation settings
Two sets of cases were designed and simulated. The ﬁrst set of cases
were basically conducted in one typical weekend day in summer with
ﬁxed PV and EV penetration levels and only one single retail price
scheme. The main objective is to test and validate the proposed simu-
lation and evaluation methods, including: (1) to test the multiagent-
based simulation framework, (2) to demonstrate the calculation and
implications of the evaluation indexes, (3) to verify the performance of
the proposed techniques for convergence, and (4) to evaluate the in-
ﬂuence of relevant parameters on the simulation results. The second set
of cases compared three existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms in
current and future scenarios in GB, and the sensitivities of various
factors, including PV and EV penetration levels, seasons and day types
and retail price schemes, were examined. The main objective is to de-
rive some practical implications on applying P2P energy sharing me-
chanisms in GB. Note that the related parameters, including ramping
rates, learning rates, initial values and maximum number of iterations,
were assessed in the ﬁrst set of cases, and suitable values were chosen
and adopted to conduct the second set of cases.
In both sets of cases, a population of 20 residential customers in a
community were considered. The types and parameters of the appli-
ances, the occupancy and the customer demand were obtained by
Fig. 5. The hierarchy of the evaluation indexes.
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randomly sampling from the CREST model. The ﬂexible appliances
considered included: (1) wet appliances, including dish washers,
tumble dryers, washing machines and washer dryers, modelled as non-
interruptible appliances by Formulas (A4)–(A7) in Appendix A.1, and 2)
water heating appliances, such as domestic electric storage water hea-
ters, modelled as thermostatically controlled appliances by Formulas
(A8)–(A11) in Appendix A.1. Inﬂexible, i.e. the must-run, appliances
included consumer electronics, like televisions, personal computers and
printers, and cooking appliances like microwaves and kettles. The
complete list of appliances, including 34 appliances, refer to the “Ap-
pliance Model Conﬁguration” sheet of the CREST model. Note that not
all the appliances in the list appeared in every premise. Whether a
customer owned an appliance was a result of the sampling from a given
probability distribution based on realistic GB statistics. As for EVs, the
parameters for Formulas (A12)–(A17) in Appendix A.1 were obtained
by sampling form the EV database based on the GB statistics.
For both sets of cases, within a day, the bidding and pricing process
was assumed to be conducted on a day-ahead basis, in which all the
generation and demand forecast for each customer were assumed to be
accurate. The time step of simulation, tΔ , was assumed to be 1 h. The
simulation stopped if the maximum internal price diﬀerence between
two consecutive iterations was less than 0.001 £/kWh, indicating that
the simulation converged. The maximum number of iterations was set
as 200 as a part of the last-defence mechanism as discussed in Section
3.3.4. The simulation under conventional trading arrangements be-
tween customers and retailers, as shown in Fig. 1(a) was conducted in
some cases as a reference for comparison.
When evaluating both sets of cases, the weighting factors were as-
sumed as = = =α α α 0.33,1 2 3 = = =β β β 0.331 2 3 and = =γ γ 0.5,1 2 in-
dicating that all the indexes are of the same importance. Note that this
will not lose any generality, and in practice, the values of weighting
factors can be chosen according to speciﬁc considerations and needs.
All the cases were simulated using MATLAB, and the decision-
making models of prosumer agents were solved using CPLEX.
Remarks: Note that this paper is aimed to use some practical present
and future scenarios of GB mainly to validate the proposed simulation
and evaluation methodology and also to give some (but not complete)
implications on the potential beneﬁts of P2P energy sharing, rather
than have the ambitions to comprehensively evaluate the impact of P2P
energy sharing on present and future GB. If one wants to comprehen-
sively evaluate present and future scenarios in GB, it is important to
consider the composition of P2P energy sharing communities/regions,
because the proportion of local generation and ﬂexible demand and the
extent to which they are complementary with each other may aﬀect the
ﬁnal beneﬁts signiﬁcantly, which has been preliminarily revealed by
another piece of our research [56]. However, in practice, how the
customers will be grouped is a result of the market competition among
the companies who engage the customers to run P2P business, and is
also aﬀected by other factors including market policies and the capacity
of physical electricity networks. Moreover, the geographical distribu-
tion of customers may be quite uneven across GB, resulting in the fact
that the PV and EV penetration and demand proﬁles of one area may
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those in another area. Therefore, to use the
data randomly sampled from the CREST model, which just reﬂects the
average situation of GB, is not suﬃcient to given detailed evaluation for
the whole GB. More detailed data models with geographical distribu-
tion information are essential, and a number of other factors like
market policies and network constraints need to be considered to
conduct more comprehensive evaluation for GB. This is a valuable piece
of work to be done in the future but out of the scope of this paper.
5.2. The ﬁrst set of cases
In the ﬁrst set of cases, the SDR mechanism was adopted. Half (i.e.
10) of the customers owned PV panels but no EVs, and in contrast the
other half (also 10 customers) owned EVs but no PV panels. A weekend
day in July was assumed for using the CREST model to generate the PV
generation and appliance demand data and using the EV database to
generate the EV data. A ﬂat retail price, 14.57 pence/kWh, was con-
sidered, and the export price in the GB feed-in tariﬀ scheme was used,
being 5.03 pence/kWh. The initial internal selling and buying prices in
the SDR mechanism were set as the export and retail prices respec-
tively, except the ﬁnal. With the above settings, ﬁve cases were simu-
lated:
• Case 1–1: base case without using any extra convergence techni-
ques, mainly for testing the basic simulation and evaluation pro-
cesses;
• Case 1–2: Technique 1, step length control was used;
• Case 1–3: Technique 2, learning process involvement was used;
• Case 1–4: the inﬂuence of initial values was examined;
• Case 1–5: the inﬂuence of the maximum number of iterations in the
last-defence mechanism was examined.
5.2.1. Case 1-1: Base case without convergence techniques
Fig. 6 illustrates the overall net consumption (i.e. consumption
minus generation) as well as PV generation in the energy sharing region
throughout the day. Both the results under the SDR mechanism and the
conventional paradigm are presented.
In Fig. 6(a), the surplus energy sold to the retailer from 6:00 to
19:00 was much less than that of the same time period in Fig. 6(b), and
the net consumption from 20:00 to 24:00 became negative in Fig. 6(a),
compared to that in Fig. 6(b). This fact indicates that, under the SDR
mechanism, some EVs charged more during 6:00–19:00 and then dis-
charged during 20:00–24:00 to supply the demand of other prosumers,
i.e. the prosumers did share energy with each other using the ﬂexibility
contained in the EVs. Whether this sharing was able to bring more
economic and technical beneﬁts, is still not straightforward from Fig. 6.
The net energy cost (i.e. energy cost for buying electricity minus
earnings from selling electricity) distribution is shown in Fig. 7 to
compare the economic beneﬁts under the two mechanisms.
In Fig. 7, it is observed that, under the SDR mechanism, most pro-
sumers (15 of 20) had lower net energy cost than that under the con-
ventional paradigm, indicating that most prosumers beneﬁt and are
willing to stay in the SDR mechanism. However, it is also noticed that 5
prosumers, numbered from 16 to 20, had higher net energy cost in the
SDR mechanism, thus having the incentives to opt out of the me-
chanism. Besides, there was huge cost diﬀerence among the prosumer
population for both mechanisms, but it is not straightforward in which
mechanism the diﬀerence was larger.
To assess the performance of the mechanisms quantitatively, the
values of the evaluation indexes deﬁned in Section 4 were calculated, as
presented in Table 1.
Regarding the economic indexes in Table 1, it is observed that the
total economic beneﬁts (indicated by the value tapping index) and the
equality among the prosumers under the two mechanisms were almost
the same, but some prosumers had increased energy cost (as illustrated
in Fig. 7), resulting in a lower mark in participation willing index and
thus a lower economic performance index for the SDR mechanism.
Regarding the technical indexes, the SDR mechanism had prominently
higher marks in energy balance and self-suﬃciency index. In summary,
the SDR mechanism had a slightly higher overall performance than the
conventional paradigm, with a worse economic performance but an
even better technical performance.
The values of the evaluation indexes, as listed in Table 1, can be
interpreted mainly from two perspectives. First of all, taking the value
of the overall performance index under SDR mechanism as an example,
0.53 gives a preliminary impression that it is a good score which is
slightly higher than the median of the score band. The reasoning behind
this impression is that generally we could consider that the range of the
score is within [0,1], and the ideal maximum value, 1, is almost im-
possible to be reached because some indexes are contradictory to each
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other in many cases (for example the power ﬂatness index equals to 1
when the aggregated load curve throughout the time horizon is com-
pletely ﬂat, but if that happens given a time-of-use retail price scheme,
it indicates that the load curve does not respond to the retail price at all,
so it is highly possible that the values of economic indexes do not take
their maximum value, 1, at the same time).
After having this preliminary impression, the score can be compared
with that under the reference case (i.e. the conventional paradigm).
Considering that all the scores have been normalised, they are able to
be compared directly. For example, with 0.53 for SDR mechanism and
0.47 for conventional paradigm, it can be stated that the SDR me-
chanism is 12.7% ((0.53–0.47)/0.47∗100%) better than the conven-
tional paradigm in terms of the overall performance in this case. If more
mechanisms are involved and calculated, the performance of multiple
mechanisms can be compared, as shown in Section 5.3 later. Further-
more, the comparison in individual indexes has more straightforward
meaning. For example, it can be stated that the SDR mechanism helps
the whole population save 2% electricity cost than the conventional
paradigm, by comparing the value tapping index of the two mechan-
isms in Table 1.
Finally, the internal prices (taking the ones at the 5th hour as
examples) and overall net energy cost throughout the iterative im-
plementation procedure under the SDR mechanism are illustrated in
Fig. 8.
From Fig. 8, it is seen that both the internal selling and pricing price
entered “oscillation” states in which the price jumped between two
values across the iterations. This oscillation resulted in the oscillation of
the total net energy cost of the energy sharing region. These facts show
that the iteration, i.e. the bidding and pricing process within the SDR
mechanism, actually did not converge. The ﬁnal state of the price and
energy cost would be uncertain, depending on when the iteration was
forced to be stopped. In this case, the iteration was ended when the
maximum number of iterations, 200, was achieved.
Therefore, the performance of the SDR mechanism actually can be
better than that presented in Table 1, if proper techniques for con-
vergence are applied.
5.2.2. Case 1-2: validation of the step length control technique
In this part of simulation, the SDR mechanism was adopted, and the
step length control technique, was applied. Note that Formulae (8) and
(9) were used in a combined way to achieve the step length control, and
the ramping rate took the broader meaning, as presented in Section
3.3.1, in this case. The results with diﬀerent ramping rates are illu-
strated in Figs. 9 and 10.
Fig. 9 illustrated the number of iterations under diﬀerent ramping
rates, from which the convergence state could be observed. When the
ramping rate was between 0 and 0.1, the number of iterations was only
one, indicating that no change was made by any prosumer because the
allowed change was too small. When the ramping rate was between 0.1
and 0.4, the simulation converged at some iterations. A speciﬁc ex-
ample is shown in Fig. 11(a), in which the simulation converged at the
8th iteration. When the ramping rate was larger than 0.4, the simula-
tion diverged, being stopped at the maximum number of iterations,
200.
The dark blue1 line in Fig. 10 illustrates the values of the overall
performance indexes under diﬀerent ramping rates. It is observed that
the overall performance was desirable with moderate ramping rates
(roughly from 0.15 to 0.7). It is worth noting that the simulation ac-
tually diverged with a ramping rate larger than 0.4, but the perfor-
mance was still not bad with a ramping rate from 0.4 to 0.7. The reason
is that although the simulation diverged, the results oscillated mildly
around a good value, as shown in Fig. 11(b). Therefore, the ﬁnal result
might be acceptable when the simulation stopped at the maximum
number of iterations.
As shown by the dark blue line in Fig. 10, the best overall perfor-
mance was achieved when the ramping rate equalled to 0.45, but
within the cases that converged, the best performance was achieved
with the ramping rate being 0.3. The corresponding values of the
evaluation indexes are presented in Table 2 (compared with the values
in Case 1-1).
From Table 2, it is seen that with proper ramping rate setting, the
performance of the SDR mechanism became much better. Almost all the
Fig. 6. Overall net consumption and PV generation in the energy sharing region.
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
N
et
 E
ne
rg
y 
Co
st
 (£
)
Prosumer Index 
SDR Mechanism Conven?onal Paradigm
Fig. 7. Net energy cost distribution in the energy sharing region.
Table 1
Evaluation index values for Case 1-1.
Index SDR Mechanism Conventional Paradigm
Value Tapping Index (V_I) 0.02 0.00
Participation Willing Index (P_I) 0.75 1.00
Equality Index (E_I) 0.59 0.59
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.45 0.52
Energy Balance Index (EB_I) 0.47 0.20
Power Flatness Index (PF_I) 0.66 0.65
Self-Suﬃciency Index (SS_I) 0.71 0.46
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.61 0.44
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.53 0.47
1 For interpretation of color in Figs. 10, 15 and 17, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.
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indexes were signiﬁcantly higher than those under the same mechanism
without any convergence technique and the conventional paradigm,
except the equality index and power ﬂatness index being slightly lower.
In summary, the results demonstrate that P2P energy sharing, such as
the SDR mechanism with a ramping rate limit being 0.3, was able to
bring 59.57% more overall beneﬁts measured by the overall perfor-
mance index, compared to the conventional paradigm. Moreover, the
ramping rate setting aﬀected the performance of P2P energy sharing
mechanisms, being able to improve the performance to 141.51% in a
case of the SDR mechanism.
Note that in Fig. 10, the impact of the diﬀerent prosumer demand
proﬁles on the overall performance under diﬀerent ramping rates has
been illustrated. The eight light blue lines are the results given 8 typical
demand scenarios randomly sampled from the CREST model and EV
database (being typical weekdays and weekends in four seasons, so 2
(day types) ∗ 4 (seasons) = 8 (scenarios)). It can be observed that the
demand proﬁles aﬀect the overall performance signiﬁcantly, but the
conclusion that the overall performance is desirable with moderate
ramping rates still holds. Compared to the results with the base case
setting as shown by the dark blue line, the optimal ramping rate is no
longer 0.45 in some other scenarios as shown by the light blue lines.
However, in those cases, the optimal ramping rates are still around 0.45
(ranging from 0.3 to 0.5), and the optimal performance was close to the
performance with the ramping rate being 0.45. Therefore, in practice, it
basically makes sense to use the parameter values derived from typical
cases, if no detailed historical or forecast demand proﬁles are available.
5.2.3. Case 1-3: validation of the learning process involvement technique
As presented in Section 3.3.2, involving learning process in the
decision-making model of each prosumer agent can improve the
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Fig. 8. Iterative implementation procedure under the SDR mechanism.
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Fig. 9. The number of iterations under diﬀerent ramping rates.
Fig. 10. The overall performance under diﬀerent ramping rates.
Fig. 11. The total net energy cost throughout the iterations with diﬀerent ramping rates.
Table 2
Evaluation index values for Case 1–2.
Index SDR Mechanism
(best; ramping rate= 0.3)
SDR Mechanism
(with no technique)
Conventional Paradigm
Value Tapping Index (V_I) 0.88 0.02 0.00
Participation Willing Index (P_I) 1.00 0.75 1.00
Equality Index (E_I) 0.52 0.59 0.59
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.79 0.45 0.52
Energy Balance Index (EB_I) 0.61 0.47 0.20
Power Flatness Index (PF_I) 0.57 0.66 0.65
Self-Suﬃciency Index (SS_I) 0.97 0.71 0.46
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.71 0.61 0.44
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.75 0.53 0.47
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convergence of the simulation. It was assumed that each prosumer
agent made its decision based on the estimation described by Formula
(11), in which the length of learning window, W , was set as 10. The
results with diﬀerent learning rates are illustrated in Fig. 12.
As shown in the dark blue line in Fig. 12, it is seen that the overall
performance was able to be improved by choosing proper learning
rates, which were roughly located between 0.5 and 0.9. The best overall
performance was achieved when the learning rate was 0.7. The detailed
results at this point are presented in the ﬁrst column Table 3. It is seen
that with a proper learning rate, the performance with the learning
process involvement technique is almost as good as that with the step
length control technique, only with very slight diﬀerences in a few
indexes.
With the above results, it is naturally to think that better perfor-
mance may be obtained if the two techniques, i.e. the step length
control and learning process involvement, are adopted at the same
time. Therefore, a simulation was conducted using the two techniques
at the same time. The ramping rate and learning rate were set at their
respective best values (i.e. 0.3 and 0.7 respectively). The results are
presented in the third column of Table 3. Unfortunately, it is seen that
better results cannot be obtained by simply combining the two tech-
niques.
Note that in Fig. 12, the impact of the diﬀerent prosumer demand
proﬁles on the overall performance under diﬀerent learning rates has
been illustrated. The eight light blue lines are the results given the 8
typical demand scenarios that are the same as those used in Case 1-2. It
can be observed that the demand proﬁles aﬀect the overall performance
signiﬁcantly, but the impact patterns of the learning rate on the overall
performance are similar, all being low performance at low learning
rates, higher performance at moderate and high learning rates and a bit
lower performance at very high learning rates that are close to 1.
Compared to the results with the base case setting as shown by the dark
blue line, the optimal learning rate is not always 0.7 in other scenarios
as shown by the light blue lines. However, in those cases, the optimal
learning rates are still around 0.7 (ranging from 0.65 to 0.85), and the
optimal performance did not deviate severely from that with the
learning rate being 0.7.
5.2.4. Case 1-4: Inﬂuence of initial values
The results of the above three cases, Case 1-1 to Case 1-3, were all
derived based on the same initial value of the internal price. This case
examined whether or not and to what extent the results would be af-
fected by the selection of initial values. For each typical ramping rate in
Case 1-2, 10 simulations with randomised initial values were con-
ducted, and the results (the light red curves) with their average (the
dark red curve) were plotted in Fig. 13, compared to the results derived
by only one simulation with ﬁxed initial value in Case 1-2 (the blue
curve). Similar work was done for each typical learning rate in Case 1-3
Fig. 12. The overall performance under diﬀerent learning rates.
Table 3
Evaluation index values for Case 1-3.
Index SDR Mechanism
(best; learning rate= 0.7)
SDR Mechanism
(best; ramping rate= 0.3)
SDR Mechanism
(ramping rate= 0.3, and learning rate= 0.7)
Conventional Paradigm
Value Tapping Index (V_I) 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.00
Participation Willing Index (P_I) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Equality Index (E_I) 0.57 0.52 0.50 0.59
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.52
Energy Balance Index (EB_I) 0.59 0.61 0.48 0.20
Power Flatness Index (PF_I) 0.61 0.57 0.52 0.65
Self-Suﬃciency Index (SS_I) 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.46
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.71 0.71 0.64 0.44
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.47
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as well, and the results are presented in Fig. 14. Note that the initial
values were randomly sampled between the export price and the retail
price evenly.
In Figs. 13 and 14, the initial values did aﬀect the simulation results,
especially if the ramping/learning rate took an extreme value (i.e. close
to the lower limit, 0, or to the upper limit, 1). In spite of this, as shown
in Fig. 13, initial values had small eﬀects on the ﬁnal results, when the
ramping rate took moderate values between 0.3 and 0.6.
5.2.5. Case 1-5: inﬂuence of the maximum number of iterations in the last-
defence mechanism
In the previous cases (Case 1-1 through Case 1-4), the maximum
number of iterations in the last-defence mechanism was assumed as
200. However, if diﬀerent numbers are taken, the evaluation results
may change. This is because the simulation may be forced to stop before
convergence if the number taken is too small. Therefore, this sub-
section assesses the inﬂuence of the maximum number of iterations and
ﬁgures out the suitable number to be used in later cases.
A series of simulation adopting the SDR mechanism with the step
length control technique were carried out, given a variety of maximum
number of iterations and ramping rates. The results are presented in
Figs. 15 and 16.
Fig. 15 illustrates the number of iterations when the simulation
stopped, given diﬀerent maximum number of iterations and ramping
rates. In the scenarios marked as green colour, the number of iterations
used are all smaller than the maximum number of iterations, revealing
that the simulation converged for these scenarios. On the other hand, in
the scenarios marked as red colour, the number of iterations used are all
exactly equal to the maximum number of iterations, showing that the
simulation did not converge when it was forced to stop because the
maximum number was reached. It can be observed that lower ramping
rates resulted in quicker convergence. Therefore, the choice of
Fig. 13. The overall performance under multiple ramping rates with diﬀerent initial value settings.
Fig. 14. The overall performance under multiple learning rates with diﬀerent initial value settings.
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maximum number of iterations depends on the choice of ramping rates.
As concluded in Case 1-2, which is again veriﬁed by the results in
Fig. 16, with the ramping rate being 0.3, the overall performance is
stably the best, and thus should be chosen. As shown in Fig. 15, the
simulation converges very fast given the ramping rate equals to 0.3, and
thus the maximum number of iterations can be chosen as a very small
number. However, considering that the iterations needed may vary
with diﬀerent scenarios (e.g. diﬀerent PV/EV penetration, seasonal
factors, etc.), a much larger number, 200, was chosen for later cases, to
leave great margin. Note that there is no way to decide a perfect
maximum number of iterations a priori, because we never know whe-
ther a convergence exists or how many iterations are needed to reach it
until we actually reach it. Also, it is neither practical nor necessary to
do the similar sensitivity analysis for each case later, because that will
be very computationally expensive and repetitive. Considering all the
above results and facts, it is basically reasonable to assign 200 as the
maximum number of iterations in the following set of cases.
5.3. The second set of cases
In the second sets of cases, three P2P energy sharing mechanisms,
i.e. SDR, MMR and BS, were simulated and compared in current and
future scenarios of GB. First of all, a base case was established with a
preliminary comparison among the three mechanisms. After that, the
sensitivities of a series of factors were examined on top of the base case.
Speciﬁcally, four cases were studied:
• Case 2-1: base case in which the three mechanisms were simulated
and evaluated;
• Case 2-2: current and future scenarios with diﬀerent PV and EV
penetration levels were examined;
• Case 2-3: results with diﬀerent seasons and day types were ex-
amined;
• Case 2-4: results with diﬀerent retail price schemes were examined.
5.3.1. Case 2-1: Base case with the three mechanisms simulated and
compared
The settings of this case kept the same as those of Case 1-1, except
that the step length control technique was used in this case to facilitate
the convergence and to obtain better performance. The ramping rate
was set as 0.3 considering its good performance as shown in Case 1-2
and Case 1-4. The three P2P energy sharing mechanisms were simu-
lated and evaluated, and the results are presented in Table 4.
From Table 4, it is observed that, in terms of the overall perfor-
mance, the SDR mechanism performed the best, followed by the MMR
mechanism with lower marks, and both of them were much better than
the BS mechanism and the conventional paradigm.
The SDR and MMR mechanisms tapped much cost-saving potentials
in P2P energy sharing while guaranteeing that all the participants ob-
tained no less beneﬁt than that under the conventional paradigm.
Moreover, the SDR and MMR mechanisms largely increased local en-
ergy balance and self-suﬃciency of the region. Therefore, both the
economic and technical index values of the SDR and MMR mechanisms
were much higher than those under the conventional mechanism. In
spite of the above advantages, it is also noticed that the SDR and MMR
mechanisms slightly decreased the income equality and power ﬂatness
within the region.
As for the BS mechanism, its overall performance was very close to
(even slightly worse than) the conventional paradigm. Although it
tapped 34% more economic values than the conventional paradigm,
half of the participants of the BS mechanism received lower income
than that under the conventional income. The reason was that in the BS
mechanism, all the participants shared the total energy cost/income
averagely, so that the ones with larger contribution (e.g. with high local
power generation) were not remunerated fairly.
5.3.2. Case 2-2: results in current and future GB scenarios with diﬀerent PV
and EV penetration levels
Although there are some PV panels and EVs owned by residential
customers in GB, the overall number is still small. Therefore, the zero
Fig. 15. The number of iterations when the simulation stopped given diﬀerent maximum number of iterations and ramping rates.
Fig. 16. The overall performance given diﬀerent maximum number of iterations and ramping rates.
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PV and EV penetration scenario was set as the baseline representing the
current situation in GB. Future scenarios were generated by gradually
increasing the PV and EV penetration levels with a step of 10%. The
simulation settings were the same as those of Case 2-1, except that the
ownership of PV and EV for each customer was randomly decided ac-
cording to the pre-set penetration levels. For example, if the PV/EV
penetration was 10%, then 10% of customers would own PV/EV, and
the corresponding PV/EV parameters would be derived from the CREST
model / EV database. The three P2P energy sharing mechanisms were
simulated and evaluated in these scenarios, and the results are pre-
sented in Fig. 17.
In Fig. 17, the overall performance scores of the three P2P energy
sharing mechanisms as well as the conventional mechanism are pre-
sented with colours corresponding to their values. The colour changes
from red, to yellow, then to green gradually, with the increase of the
index value from 0 to 1. The ﬁrst observation is that the SDR me-
chanism performed the best in most scenarios with a large area of green
and light yellow data. The MMR mechanism had good performance
mainly in scenarios with moderate PV penetration levels (from 10% to
60%). The BS mechanism generally did not outperform the reference
conventional paradigm, except some scenarios where the EV penetra-
tion was very low.
It is also noted that both the MMR and BS mechanisms obtained
better performance than the conventional paradigm in scenarios where
the EV penetration is very low (especially zero). This is because the
MMR and BS mechanisms were designed to share local surplus gen-
eration without considering stimulating ﬂexible demands [16]. There-
fore, they performed well with low EV penetration, but not that well
with the increase of EV penetration.
Another interesting result is that the conventional paradigm per-
formed even better than all the three P2P energy sharing mechanisms
when (1) the PV penetration equalled to zero or (2) both the PV and EV
penetration were equal or very close to 100%. The reasons are as fol-
lows: (1) when there was no local PV generation in the whole region, no
energy could be shared among the customers, so to optimise the power
schedule individually was the best solution; (2) when almost every
prosumer owned PV and EV, to a very large extent they were able to
consume their own PV generation by using the ﬂexibility of their own
EVs, so to optimise schedules individually in the conventional paradigm
was still able to derive good solutions.
In addition, it is noted that in three scenarios under the MMR me-
chanism (i.e. PV 100% & EV 80–100%) as shown in Fig. 17(b), the
overall performance scores were negative, which indicates that the total
incomes in these scenarios were even less than those in the conven-
tional paradigm (referred to Section 4.1.1).
5.3.3. Case 2-3: results of diﬀerent seasons and day types
At ﬁrst, the impact of seasons were examined. Besides the summer
weekend day of July in Case 2-1, three typical weekend days in
January, April and October were chosen to represent winter, spring and
autumn. All the other case settings were the same as those of Case 2-1,
except that those related to seasonal factors were derived by the CREST
model. For example, the PV generation and some power usage would
vary with seasons. The performance of the three mechanisms as well as
the reference (Ref.) conventional paradigm in diﬀerent seasons is pre-
sented in Table 5.
In Table 5, it is observed that although the index values varied with
seasons for all the mechanisms, the amount of variation was not sig-
niﬁcant. More importantly, the basic conclusion still held in the typical
days for all seasons. That is, the SDR mechanism performed the best in
all the three indexes, followed by the MMR mechanism, and the per-
formance of the BS mechanism and the conventional paradigm were
roughly at the same level.
Customers’ behaviours vary between weekdays and weekends, so
the impact of day types were examined as well. A typical weekday in
July was chosen, and the corresponding data were derived from the
CREST model and EV database. All the other settings kept the same as
those in Case 2-1. The results are presented in Table 6.
Form Table 6, it is observed that the results under diﬀerent day
types did not diﬀer from each other prominently. The conclusions on
the performance of the three mechanisms still held both for weekdays
and weekends.
5.3.4. Case 2-4: results of diﬀerent retail price schemes
In Case 2-1 and all the other previous cases, a ﬂat retail price was
assumed throughout the horizon. In this case, it was replaced by two of
the most common time-of-use retail price schemes in GB, i.e. Economy
7 and Economy 10. The rate settings of Economy 7 and Economy 10
were described in Table 7, and the evaluation results were presented in
Table 8.
The results in Table 8 show that the conclusions derived in Case 2-1
still held, although the performance indexes values would vary with the
retail price adopted.
5.4. Remarks on the choices of cases and parameters that were evaluated in
this paper
The cases were divided as two sets. The ﬁrst set of cases are
methodology-oriented, focusing on demonstrating the eﬀectiveness of
all the methods proposed in this paper, including the multiagent-based
simulation, evaluation indexes, step length control technique and
learning process involvement technique. Speciﬁcally, in Case 1-1, the
proposed multiagent-based simulation and evaluation indexes were
demonstrated and veriﬁed, by showing the detailed results (including
power curves, income distribution and internal price evolution) and
evaluation scores (including the scores from individual index level to
the overall index level) with detailed analysis. In Case 1-2, the step
length control technique was validated, while in Case 1-3 the learning
process involvement technique was validated. In Case 1-2, 1-3, 1-4 and
1-5, four parameters (i.e. the ramping rate, learning rate, initial values
Table 4
Evaluation index values for Case 2–1.
Index SDR Mechanism MMR Mechanism BS Mechanism Conventional Paradigm
Value Tapping Index (V_I) 0.92 0.62 0.34 0.00
Participation Willing Index (P_I) 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00
Equality Index (E_I) 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.59
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.80 0.71 0.46 0.52
Energy Balance Index (EB_I) 0.57 0.30 0.21 0.20
Power Flatness Index (PF_I) 0.53 0.59 0.65 0.65
Self-Suﬃciency Index (SS_I) 0.98 0.69 0.47 0.46
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.69 0.51 0.44 0.44
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.74 0.61 0.45 0.48
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and maximum number of iterations) were tested respectively, because
they are key parameters regarding the proposed methods and may af-
fect the simulation results and performance of P2P energy sharing
mechanisms signiﬁcantly.
It is worth noting that the ﬁrst set of cases were all evaluated in only
one scenario or several typical scenarios with only one P2P energy
sharing mechanism (SDR), one possibility of PV installation and EV
ownership (half customers own PV panels but no EVs, and the other half
Fig. 17. The overall performance scores of the three mechanisms in scenarios with diﬀerent PV and EV penetration levels.
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own EVs but no PV panels) and one retail price scheme (ﬂat price). The
scenario chosen is just a small set of the large numbers of scenarios,
because the focus of the ﬁrst set of cases is to verify the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed methodology, rather than give a thorough evaluation and
sensitivity analysis, which is in contrast the focus of the second set of
cases.
The motivation behind the second set of cases is twofold: one is to
compare and evaluate the P2P energy sharing mechanisms in existing
studies (speciﬁcally, SDR, MMR and BS mechanisms), and the other is
to provide some practical implications on applying P2P energy sharing
in current and future scenarios of GB. Due to the former aspect of
motivation, the three existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms were
evaluated and compared from Case 2-1 through 2-4. Because of the
latter aspect of motivation, various scenarios of GB were examined and
a number of sensitivity analysis was conducted. A base case was ﬁrst
provided in Case 2-1, and then the scenarios characterized with dif-
ferent factors were assessed. The factors include PV and EV penetration
levels (Case 2-2), seasons (Case 2-3), day types (Case 2-3) and retail
price schemes (Case 2-4). These factors were considered because they
are all important practical factors that may aﬀect the performance of
P2P energy sharing mechanisms.
The cases and parameters that were evaluated in this paper have
eﬀectively veriﬁed the proposed methodology, and provided good
evaluation for existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms in the GB
background. In spite of this, we also note that the evaluation will never
be totally complete because there will be more and more P2P energy
sharing mechanisms designed in the future and more factors may need
to be considered in the future or in other countries. We hope that the
work presented in this paper provides useful methodology and good
foundation for the followers to work with.
6. Conclusions and future work
A multiagent-based simulation framework and a systematic index
system were developed for the simulation and evaluation of P2P energy
sharing mechanisms. The multiagent-based simulation framework are
composed of three types of agents and three corresponding models.
Two techniques, i.e. step length control and learning process involve-
ment, were proposed to facilitate the convergence of simulation, and a
last-defence mechanism was described to deal with divergence. The
evaluation index system is a hierarchical system composed of three
economic indexes and three technical indexes. The indexes were nor-
malised and synthesized to reﬂect the overall performance.
The proposed simulation framework and evaluation indexes were
validated in current and future scenarios of GB, and some practical
implications were obtained. The following conclusions were derived
based on the numerical results:
(1) The proposed techniques, both step length control and learning
process involvement, are able to facilitate convergence of simula-
tion and thus improve the performance of P2P energy sharing
mechanisms. The eﬀects depend on the values of ramping rate and
learning rate. At proper values, the improvement brought by the
two techniques is at the same level.
(2) Generally, P2P energy sharing among residential customers has the
potential to bring many economic and technical beneﬁts to GB in
the future, compared to the conventional paradigm. The two ex-
ceptions are the scenario where the PV penetration in the region is
close to zero, and the scenario where almost each customer owns
PV and EV simultaneously.
(3) Overall, the SDR mechanism outperforms all the other mechanisms
and the MMR mechanism is well performed in most scenarios, al-
though with some slight reduction in a few individual indexes
compared to the conventional paradigm. The BS mechanism gen-
erally reaps no more beneﬁt compared to the conventional non-P2P
paradigm. This conclusion is not sensitive to season factors, day
types and retail price schemes adopted.
Based on the work in this paper, the following directions are iden-
tiﬁed for further exploration:
(1) The communication among agents was considered perfect without
any delay or error. The imperfect communication may undermine
the performance of P2P energy sharing, and is worth further study.
(2) It was assumed that all the agents made decisions with perfect
forecast for the future. In fact, there may be signiﬁcant un-
certainties in renewable generation and human behaviours, which
may undermine the performance of P2P energy sharing. This issue
is to be studied in the future.
(3) The energy sharing coordinator was considered as a market op-
erator that only took care of energy trading. Further research is to
Table 5
Evaluation index values under diﬀerent seasons for Case 2–3.
Index Spring (April) Summer (July) Autumn (October) Winter (January)
SDR MMR BS Ref SDR MMR BS Ref SDR MMR BS Ref SDR MMR BS Ref
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.79 0.68 0.46 0.51 0.80 0.71 0.46 0.52 0.83 0.71 0.52 0.58 0.86 0.76 0.54 0.57
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.68 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.69 0.51 0.44 0.44 0.69 0.49 0.43 0.42 0.76 0.49 0.40 0.40
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.73 0.58 0.44 0.46 0.74 0.61 0.45 0.48 0.76 0.60 0.48 0.50 0.81 0.62 0.47 0.49
Table 6
Evaluation index values with diﬀerent day types for Case 2–3.
Index SDR Mechanism MMR Mechanism BS Mechanism Conventional Mechanism
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.78 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.46 0.46 0.52 0.52
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.63 0.69 0.50 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.70 0.74 0.60 0.61 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48
Table 7
Tariﬀ Structure for Economy 7 and Economy 10 in GB.
Tariﬀ Type Standard Rate
(pence/kWh)
Oﬀ-Peak
Rate (pence/
kWh)
Standard Period Oﬀ-Peak Period
Economy 7 18.30 7.88 7:00–24:00 0:00–7:00
Economy 10 18.68 10.07 5:00–13:00
16:00–20:00
22:00–24:00
0:00–5:00
13:00–16:00
20:00–22:00
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analyse and tackle the physical problems (e.g. over voltage and
congestion) in the power networks along with P2P energy sharing.
(4) The case studies in this paper did not consider household energy
storage in residential houses of GB. We note that in the future the
price of household energy storage may decrease dramatically, given
which household energy storage cannot be ignored and should be
considered in the evaluation. If household energy storage is con-
sidered, the proposed simulation and evaluation methodology is
still applicable, but the results of evaluation on existing P2P energy
sharing mechanisms may be diﬀerent.
(5) The demand data used in this paper was randomly sampled from
GREST model, which just reﬂects the average situation of GB. Data
with more details on the geographical distribution of local gen-
eration and demand across GB is needed to conduct more com-
prehensive evaluation of the impact of P2P energy sharing on GB.
Moreover, how the customers are grouped, which is aﬀected by
market competition, policies and physical network constraints, may
have great eﬀects, and worth being studied in the future.
P2P energy sharing is an emerging direction that has the potential to
reshape the paradigm of power systems and bring various beneﬁts for
both customers and power systems. This paper established basic si-
mulation and evaluation framework for P2P energy sharing, based on
which a number of further work can be further conducted. In terms of
the decision model of customers, the impact of various uncertainties
can be considered. Moreover, more devices, such as energy storage
systems, and more types of customers, such as commercial and in-
dustrial customers, can be involved. In terms of the implementation
model, the impact of imperfect communication and the corresponding
solutions need to be studied. Furthermore, improved pricing models
that are able to mitigate power network problems can be developed for
the coordinators. As for the evaluation index system, more indexes can
be added according to practical needs in other scenarios in the future.
In addition, more detailed evaluation could be conducted for speciﬁc
countries/areas by having local generation and demand data with
geographical information and considering the grouping of customers.
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Appendix A
When evaluating the supply and demand ratio (SDR), mid-market rate (MMR) and bill sharing (BS) mechanisms for residential customers in the
GB scenarios, the abstract agents and models in the multiagent-based simulation framework described in Section 3 are realised as follows.
A.1. Prosumer agent and decision-making model
The decision-making model in a prosumer agent, as abstractly shown in Formula (3), is realised as in this sub-section, in which the objective
function is to minimise the net cost (i.e. maximise the net income) while satisfying a set of constraints on physical device limits, human comfort and
ﬂexibility of diﬀerent types of appliances. The speciﬁc form of the objective function varies with the P2P energy sharing mechanism adopted because
diﬀerent billing rules are speciﬁed in diﬀerent mechanisms. For the SDR mechanism and BS mechanism, the objective function is as follows:
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where T is the total time steps considered for scheduling; Af refers to the set of ﬂexible appliances which include noninterruptible and thermal
appliances (denoted as = ∪A A Af NL TCL); xδ represents the power of the ﬂexible appliance; xch and xdis are the charging and discharging power of
the electric vehicle, and ηch and ηdis denote the charging and discharging eﬃciency; −Pmust run represents the sum of inﬂexible demand; PPV denotes
the power output of PV panels; tΔ is the length of each time step. pt
internal denotes the internal price issued by the coordinator agent in the P2P energy
sharing mechanism, which is composed of buying and selling prices:
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In contrast, for the MMR mechanism, the objective function is in another form:
Table 8
Evaluation index values for Case 2–4.
Index SDR Mechanism MMR Mechanism BS Mechanism Conventional Mechanism
Flat E7 E10 Flat E7 E10 Flat E7 E10 Flat E7 E10
Economic Performance Index (EP_I) 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.71 0.58 0.72 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.52 0.51 0.51
Technical Performance Index (TP_I) 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.44
Overall Performance Index (OP_I) 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.61 0.55 0.63 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.50
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The constraints under diﬀerent mechanisms are the same, as presented as follows.
(1) The constraints for non-interruptible appliances (i.e. ∈ Aδ NL) include
= ∀ ∈ ∪ ∈ Ax t b e T δ0 [1, ) ( , ], ,δ t, NL (A4)
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= ∀ ∈ Tx P t{0, } .δ t δ, (A7)
In Formulas (A4)–(A7), b and e are the allowed start time and required end time of the task respectively; Lδ is the time duration of the task (note that
− ⩾e b Lδ); Pδ is the rate power of the appliance. Formula (A4) regulates that the appliance is not allowed to work outside the permissioned time
interval. Formula (A5) guarantees that the task needs to be ﬁnished before deadline. Formula (A6) requires that the task cannot be interrupted.
Finally, Formula (A7) speciﬁes that the possible power status of the appliance.
(2) The constraints for thermostatically controlled appliances (i.e. ∈ Aδ TCL) include:
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= − ∀ ∈C ρ d c θ θ t T· · ·( ) [1, ],t i twater req en, (A10)
= ∀ ∈ Tx P t[0, ] .δ t δ, (A11)
In Formulas (A8)–(A11), ρ is a constant coeﬃcient for unit conversion between J and kWh; M is the mass of water in full storage; cwater is the speciﬁc
heat of water; θ ,0 θreq and θen represent the initial water temperature, required water temperature and cold water temperature respectively; θlow and
θup represent the lower and upper limits of water temperature;C represents the heat energy demand for hot water use; d represents the amount of hot
water drawn. Formula (A8) speciﬁes that the total heat energy gained from the heater plus the initial heat energy stored in the tank till the t th time
step should be no less than the total heat demand till the same time step. Similarly, Formula (A9) guarantees that the total heat stored in the tank
cannot exceed the upper limit. Formula (A10) calculates the heat energy demand due to hot water use. Formula (A11) shows that the heating power
should be within a range.
(3) The constraints for the electric vehicle include:
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= −SOC SOC SOCΔ ,t tin out (A13)
⩽ ⩽ ∀ ∈ ∪SOC SOC SOC t t t T[1, ] [ , ],tmin max out in (A14)
=SOC SOC ,T0 (A15)
⩽ ⩽x P0 ,tch maxch (A16)
⩽ ⩽P x 0.tmaxdis dis (A17)
In Formulas (A12)–(A17), SOC represents the state of charge (SOC) of the battery on the electric vehicle; SOC0 is the initial SOC; E is the rated
capacity of the battery; tin and tout are the time steps at which the electric vehicle plugs in and out (i.e. return and leave home); SOCΔ is the energy
consumption of the electric vehicle during the travel, measured by SOC; SOCmin and SOCmax are the lower and upper limits of SOC; Pmaxch and Pmaxdis are
the upper limits of charging and discharging power. Formula (A12) calculates the SOC of EV battery at any time step t. Formula (A13) describes the
relationship between the SOC at plug-in time and plug-out time. Formula (A14) requires that the SOC at any time step should be kept within a pre-
deﬁned range. Formula (A15) requires that the SOC at the end of the scheduling horizon should be equal to that at the very beginning, ensuring that
the scheduling can keep going beyond the current scheduling horizon. Formulas (A16) and (A17) specify the upper limits of charging and dis-
charging power, in which the charging power is denoted as positive while the discharging power is negative. It is worth noting that in the situation
described by Formulas (A12)–(A17), the electric vehicle just leaves home once. But this will not lose any generality, because it is straightforward to
model the situations where the electric vehicle leaves/returns home several times, by adding more formulas that are similar to Formula (A13). It is
also worth noting that in (A12)–(A17), it is assumed that tout < t ,in but it is straightforward how to formulate the situations where tout > t ,in so it is not
presented here.
So far, the decision-making model in a prosumer agent is formulated in detail. Note that the decision variables are denoted by x which are the
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power consumption level of appliances and charging/discharging power of the electric vehicle. The formulated decision-making model consists of
the objective function (A1)–(A3) and constraints (A4)–(A17), which is in nature a mixed integer linear programming problem that is able to be
solved by mature solution tools.
A.2. Coordinator agent and pricing models
As stated in the beginning of Appendix A, three existing P2P energy sharing mechanisms, i.e. SDR, MMR and BS, are chosen to be evaluated. They
specify diﬀerent pricing models in the coordinator agent.
A.2.1. Supply and demand ratio mechanism
In the SDR mechanism, prosumers are required to provide energy bids for the coordinator at every iteration. Speciﬁcally, based on the results of
the decision-making model presented in Section A.1, the energy bid of a prosumer is given by
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in which = ∈ ∈∗ ∗ ∗ ∗x A Tx x x δ t{ , , }, ,δ t t t, ch dis f are the optimal solution of the decision-making model consisting of Formulas (A1)–(A17). With the energy
bids from all the prosumers, the coordinator calculates the internal selling price by
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and the internal buying price by
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where
 = < ∈− n e n{ | 0, }n t,bid (A22)
and
 = ⩾ ∈+ n e n{ | 0, }.n t,bid (A23)
In Formulas (A19)–(A23), rtexport and rtretail are the export and retail price between the coordinator and the retailer as illustrated in Fig. 2; SDR
represents the supply and demand ratio of the whole P2P energy sharing region. Formulas (A19)–(A23) establish the pricing model in the co-
ordinator agent under the SDR mechanism. It can be seen that the internal price reﬂects the supply and demand relationship within the energy
sharing region, thus encouraging energy sharing and energy balance in the region.
A.2.2. Mid-market rate mechanism
The basic logic behind the MMR mechanism is that the internal price should be always set at the middle of the export price and retail price so that
all the prosumers, for both producers and consumers, beneﬁt fairly from the internal energy sharing. The MMRmechanism requires each prosumer to
provide the energy bid that contains both generation and demand at each time step separately rather than an overall net demand as that in the SDR
mechanism:
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With the energy bids of all the prosumers, the coordinator calculates the internal price in diﬀerent ways according to the relationship between total
generation and demand in the energy sharing region. If the generation is equal to demand, the internal buying and selling price are equal, taking the
average of the export and retail price:
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If the generation is less than demand, the deﬁcit generation has to be supplied by the power imported from the retailer at the retail price, and the
cost of this import should be covered. Therefore, in this situation, the internal selling price keeps the same as that in Formula (A25), but the buying
price is modiﬁed:
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Similarly, if the generation is higher than demand, the surplus generation needs to be sold to the retailer at the export price, and this part of
income needs to be distributed among all the prosumers who provide electricity by generation or EV discharging. The internal price is calculated as
follows:
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Formulas (A25)–(A27) compose the pricing model in the coordinator agent under mid-market rate mechanism.
A.2.3. Bill sharing mechanism
Bill sharing is a mechanism in which all the prosumers share the energy cost and income evenly throughout the time horizon. The energy bids
required by the BS mechanism are the same as those in the SDR mechanism as described by Formula (A18). The internal price is calculated by
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Formula (A28) actually distributes the total energy cost and income of the whole energy sharing region among the prosumers according the amount
of energy they consume and generate. Taking the buying price part as an example,

∑ ∑∈ ∈+r e· Tt t n n tretail ,bidu is the total energy cost of the whole region
for importing electricity from the retailer throughout the time horizon, which is divided by

∑ ∑∈ ∈ + e ,Tn t n t,bidl the sum of each individual prosumer’s
total positive net energy consumption throughout the time horizon.
A.3. Implementation model
The SDR mechanism speciﬁes the implementation model clearly. An iterative bidding and pricing process is adopted, and the contents of bid are
speciﬁed in detail as described in Formula (A18). The other two mechanisms, MMR and BS, specify the contents of bid as well, as described in
Formula (A24) and (A18) respectively, but do not specify if they are implemented in a one-shot or iterative way. In this paper, they are assumed to be
implemented in an iterative way that is the same as that in the SDR mechanism. The reason is twofold: one is to make it convenient to compare the
three mechanisms; the other is that the iterative process can also be seen as the procedure to work out the equilibrium that is used in the one-shot
implementation.
A.4. Retailer agent
Three retail price schemes are considered to be oﬀered by the retailer agent, i.e. ﬂat rate, Economy 7 and Economy 10. Economy 7 and Economy
10 are time-of-use pricing schemes, in which a day is divided as standard periods with a standard rate and oﬀ-peak periods with a lower oﬀ-peak
rate. The main diﬀerence between Economy 7 and Economy 10 lies in that the duration of oﬀ-peak hours is 7 h and 10 h respectively. The dis-
tribution of oﬀ-peak hours and the values of standard and oﬀ-peak rates are also diﬀerent.
The export price oﬀered by the retailer agent is considered as the export rate speciﬁed in the feed-in tariﬀ scheme of Great Britain, being a ﬁxed
value throughout a day.
Appendix B
This section analyses why the proposed step length control and learning process involvement techniques can enhance the convergence of the
multiagent-based simulation for P2P energy sharing.
Before proposing techniques for enhancing convergence, the mechanism behind divergence needs to be revealed ﬁrst. Similar to the reason for
solution infeasibility (as presented in Ref. [48]) which focused on decentralized participation of ﬂexible demand in a bulk power system with large
thermal generators, the divergence of the simulation for P2P energy sharing is in nature due to the non-(strict)convexity of the objective function of a
prosumer’s decision making model (e.g. Formulae (A1) and (A2) in Appendix A) and the reschedulable capability of some ﬂexible loads between
diﬀerent time slots (e.g. the electric water heaters (EWHs) and electric vehicles in Appendix A), which result in the discontinuity of a prosumer’s
demand function. This issue will be clariﬁed by a simple numerical example as below.
Assume that a Prosumer A only owns an electric water heater with storage that needs to consume 6 kWh in total within 2 h to prepare enough hot
water for later use. Also assume that the heating power of the water heater ranges from 0 to 4 kW. Denote =pt 1 and =pt 2 as the electricity prices of the
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two hours respectively. The demand functions of Prosumer A are expressed as
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in which =∗dt 1 and =∗dt 2 consist the optimal heating schedule of Prosumer A given the electricity prices. The demand function of Prosumer A exhibits a
discontinuity when == =p p .t t1 2 That is, the price response ( =∗dt 1 and =∗dt 2) will jump between 2 kW and 4 kW when the sign of the correlation of the
respective prices changes, and at == =p p ,t t1 2 the price response becomes singular because the total electricity cost of Prosumer A is always the same
whatever the heating schedule is.This discontinuity may result in divergence of the simulation. Assume that there is another prosumer, Prosumer B,
who only owns PV panels and the PV power outputs of the two hours are ==P 3(kW)t 1PV and ==P 3(kW)t 2PV respectively. The PV power outputs are
assumed as uncontrollable. Prosumer A and Prosumer B form a P2P energy sharing community and supply and demand ratio (SDR) mechanism
(detailed in Section A.2.1 of Appendix A) is assumed to be adopted. Assume that the retail price and export price oﬀered by the retailer are 14.57
pence/kWh and 5.03 pence/kWh respectively. If the initial schedule of Prosumer A is assumed to be
= == = = =P P2(kW) and 4(kW),t t1,iter 0EWH 2,iter 0EWH (B2)
then at 1st iteration, according to Formulae (A18)–(A23) in Appendix A, the internal buying prices will be
= == = = =p p5.03(pence/kWh) and 8.15(pence/kWh).t t1,iter 1buying 2,iter 1buying (B3)
Due to the fact that <= =p p ,t t1buying 2buying according to Formula (B1), Prosumer A will reschedule the heater as
= == = = =P P4(kW) and 2(kW),t t1,iter 1EWH 2,iter 1EWH (B4)
Fig. B1. The power schedules of Prosumer A without any techniques for convergence.
Fig. B2. The internal buying prices without any techniques for convergence.
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and send the schedule to the P2P energy sharing coordinator. Then 2nd iteration begins. The coordinator issues the new internal prices based on the
schedule made at 1st iteration, being
= == = = =p p8.15(pence/kWh) and 5.03(pence/kWh).t t1,iter 2buying 2,iter 2buying (B5)
Now >= =p p ,t t1buying 2buying so Prosumer A reschedules the heater as
= == = = =P P2(kW) and 4(kW).t t1,iter 2EWH 2,iter 2EWH (B6)
Note that the schedule becomes exactly the same as the initial schedule. Therefore, the mode in 1st and 2nd iteration will keep repeating in later
iterations, and the simulation will never end (i.e. the simulation diverges), as illustrated in Figs. B1 and B2.
The above numerical example showcases how the discontinuity of the demand functions of prosumers ﬁnally result in divergence in P2P energy
sharing. Note that as pointed in Ref. [48], little theory exists to guarantee 100% convergence for this type of problems, so heuristic techniques have
to be used to help improve convergence.
Observing the iterative process of the above example (as showcased by Formulae (B2)–(B6) and illustrated in Figs. B1 and B2), it is seen that
actually the SDR mechanism gave the right incentive signal every time (i.e. the internal prices motivated Prosumer A to change the schedule to use
excess local PV generation from Prosumer B), but due to the discontinuity of the demand function, Prosumer A over-adjusted its power consumption
every time, resulting in the oscillation-like divergence. Considering this fact, it is natural to be proposed to limit the change of power consumption of
each prosumer for avoiding divergence. Therefore, now assume that at each iteration, Prosumer A is only allowed to at most make a± 0.1 kW change
to its schedule for each time slot. Also assume that Prosumer A will not change its schedule if no more cost can be saved. Keep all the other settings
the same, and then run the simulation again. The results are shown in Figs. B3 and B4.
From Figs. B3 and B4, it can be seen that gradually guided by the internal prices, the simulation converges after 10th iteration. Thanks to the
limitation for the allowable power change at each iteration, Prosumer A does not over-adjust its power any longer, so oscillation does not happen and
convergence is ﬁnally achieved. At the convergence, the power consumption of Prosumer A is completely supplied by the local PV generation of
Prosumer B at both hours, resulting in perfect local energy balance and the least electricity cost of the whole P2P energy sharing community.
Fig. B3. The power schedules of Prosumer A
with a limitation for its power change
(± 0.1 kW).
Fig. B4. Internal buying prices with a limita-
tion for Prosumer A’s power change
(± 0.1 kW).
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The above example showcases how the limitation of power consumption change for each prosumer can contribute to better convergence. The
ramping rate speciﬁed in the step length technique (as presented in Section 3.3.1) is a direct application of this idea. As for the learning process
involvement (as presented in Section 3.3.2), the involvement of Formula (11) combines the past experience with current decision, making the
decisions more stable, i.e. making the change of bids less severe throughout iterations. Therefore, the learning process involvement technique can
somehow be seen as an indirect way to limit the change of prosumers’ decision at each iteration.
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